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Policing Money Laundering
Through Funds Transfers: A Critique of Regulation
Under the Bank Secrecy Act
SARAH JANE HutOEs*
"Wire transfers, which are essentially unregulated, have emerged as the
primary method by which high volume launderers ply their trade."'
"[M]oney launderers... always seem to be one step ahead of the cash
cops.'
2
INTRODUCTION
International funds transfers3 have become drug dealers' favorite mech-
anism for money laundering. 4 The paucity of controls on wire transfers
relative to other means of laundering monies is the primary reason for their
popularity among drug dealers. For several years, Congress and drug
enforcement officials have known of this state of affairs. Beginning with
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 5 Congress authorized the Department of
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to thank Chancellor Gerald L. Bepko of Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis
and Dean Ralph Rohner of The Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America,
for their encouragement of this work, and R. Kevin Belt, Indiana University School of Law,
1991, and Antje Petersen, Indiana University School of Law, 1992, for their assistance in
researching and editing it.
1. AmERicAN BA ,Rs AssOCiATiON MoNY LAuNDERING TASK FORCE, TOWARD A NEW
NATIONAL DRUO Pouicy-THE BANKiNG INDusTRY STRAGY, reprinted in 135 CONG. Rnc.
S5555, 5556 (daily ed. May 18, 1989) [hereinafter MONEY LAUNDER]N TAsK FORCE].
2. Money Laundering in Florida: Banking Compliance, Federal Enforcement Measures,
and the Efficacy of Current Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer and Regulatory
Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
119 (1989) [hereinafter Money Laundering in Florida] (statement of Charles A. Intriago, Esq.,
Publisher of Money Laundering Alert).
3. Funds transfers also are called wire transfers.
4. As a senior Internal Revenue Service official explained it, "[m]oney laundering is the
concealment of the existence, nature or illegal source of illicit funds in such a manner that
the funds will appear legitimate if discovered. Thus, 'dirty' money is washed in order to
appear 'clean."' Business Community's Compliance with Federal Money Laundering Statutes:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 142 (1990) (statement of Michael J. Murphy, Senior Deputy Commissioner,
Internal Revenue Service).
5. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered titles of
U.S.C.). Section 4702 of the Act (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (1988)) also
instructed the Secretary of the Treasury to undertake negotiations with nations that have strict
bank secrecy laws to increase access for United States enforcement authorities to bank records
in aid of drug prosecutions.
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the Treasury (Treasury) to impose more stringent controls on wire transfers.
Congress's purpose was to enable law enforcement officials to trace the
proceeds of narcotics trafficking more effectively.6 In October, 1989, the
Treasury announced its intention, under that authority, to impose additional
recordkeeping and reporting requirements on banks that originate or receive
the proceeds of international wire transfers. By October, 1990, the Treasury
issued a revised proposal (the 1990 Funds Transfer Proposal) and expanded
its reach to domestic as well as international wire transfers.8 Throughout
the Treasury's deliberations on this proposal, Congress has considered even
stricter statutory controls on domestic as well as international wire transfers.9
These proposals have encountered substantial opposition on several fronts
from financial institutions and financial regulatory agencies. In particular,
opponents have pointed to the array of methods and the nonstandard
formats used by financial institutions and communications systems in inter-
national and domestic wire transfers.' 0 They also have argued that the
difficulty and costs associated with standardizing the communications for-
mats to capture data sufficient for policing purposes would eliminate the
6. The Act authorized the Treasury to adopt specific recordkeeping and reporting require-
ments for wire transfers in addition to the long-standing general reporting requirements in 31
C.F.R. § 103.33 (1990). In addition, it enabled the Treasury to require financial institutions
to report transactions, including international wire transfers of funds, with foreign financial
institutions in a designated location for a limited period of time. 54 Fed. Reg. 45,770 (1989)
(discussing 31 C.F.R. § 103.25 (1990), which authorizes the Treasury to require reports of
financial institutions). Title 31 of the U.S.C. and the C.F.R., however, require the Secretary
of the Treasury to balance law enforcement priorities against the effect of new recordkeeping
on the cost and efficiency of the payments system. 31 U.S.C. § 5314 (1988); 31 C.F.R. §
103.25 (1990). The targeting for geographic areas permitted by 31 U.S.C. § 5326 (1988) and
31 C.F.R. § 103.26 (1990) is limited by the paucity of information about the parties to the
wire transfer, known as the "originator" and "beneficiary," respectively. 54 Fed. Reg. 45,770
(1989).
7. 54 Fed. Reg. 45,769 (1989) (proposed Oct. 31, 1989) [hereinafter 1989 Funds Transfer
Proposal]. The Treasury requested comment on several alternatives for the retention and
maintainance of data on international wire transfers.
8. Proposed Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations Relating to Recordkeeping
for Funds Transfers by Banks and Transmittals of Funds by Other Financial Institutions, 55
Fed. Reg. 41,696 (1990) (proposed Oct. 15, 1990) [hereinafter 1990 Funds Transfer Proposal].
This notice of proposed rulemaking covers non-bank funds transmittals such as those processed
by currency exchanges, telegraph companies, and registered securities broker-dealers. Id. at
41,704 (proposed amendments of 31 C.F.R. § 103.33, to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 103.33(0).
9. E.g., 136 CoNo. Rac. at H1722-23 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1990) (amendment to H.R. 3848
proposed by Sen. Torres). The House of Representatives passed H.R. 3848 without this
provision. S. REP. No. 460, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 15-17 (1990); House Passes Bank Bill on
Money Laundering, N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1990, at D2, col. 4.
10. E.g., Money Laundering Legislation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial
Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance
and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 70-71 (1990) [hereinafter Money Laundering Legis-
lation] (statement of Clyde H. Farnsworth, Jr., Director, Division of Federal Reserve Bank
Operations, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). For more information about
funds transfer systems, see J. DoIAN, UNrFoEm CoMMERCAt CODE TEMss AND TRANSACTONS
IN CoimmatcrL LAW § 25 (1991).
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chief attractions of wire transfers as inexpensive, speedy, efficient payment
mechanisms." In addition, bank regulators have pointed to other difficulties
of policing international as well as domestic transfers due to the number
of daily transactions 2 and to the problems of capturing data about the
parties to the transfer who are not present in the United States.' 3 Finally,
bankers have expressed their dissatisfaction with their increasing responsi-
bilities in the current war against drug trafficking, 4 particularly the pro-
portion of the investigatory burden they must bear, and questioned the
likelihood that records kept under the proposal would be useful in law
enforcement proceedings. 15
During the early debate about the need for stricter controls on funds
transfers and on the scope of those controls, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute
11. See Money Laundering Legislation, supra note 10, at 16-17 (statement of Clyde H.
Farnsworth, Jr., Director, Division of Federal Reserve Bank Operations, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System); 136 CONG. REc. H1727, H1729 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1990)
(statements of Reps. McCollum and Hiler) (debate on Torres amendment to H.R. 3848).
12. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve Board) reported
that Fedwire and the Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) process approxi-
mately 350,000 funds transfers each day with an aggregate worth of approximately $1 trillion.
55 Fed. Reg. 40,791 (1990) (final rule amending 12 C.F.R. § 210, adopting U.C.C. Article 4A
for funds transfers through Fedwire).
13. Witnesses expressed doubts that regulation of the domestic side of an international
funds transfer would provide much useful data because of bank secrecy laws enforced by
many nations. E.g., Money Laundering Legislation, supra note 10, at 16 (statement of Clyde
H. Farnsworth, Jr., Director, Division of Federal Reserve Bank Operations, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System). Some predicted that without "significant changes" in the laws
of other countries legislation such as H.R. 3848 and the funds transfer proposal would be
"less meaningful." E.g., H. RaP. No. 446, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1990) (Depository
Institution Money Laundering Amendments of 1990); see also Other Agencies Say No Soap
to Treasury's Push for High-Tech Tracking of Money Laundering, Wall St. J., Dec. 14, 1989,
at A22, col. 1.
14. See, e.g., Money Laundering in Florida, supra note 2, at 109, 111 (prepared statement
of Peter R. Fowler, Vice President and Department Head, International Private Banking,
Barclays Bank, Miami, Fla.); see also Comment Letter from U.S. League of Savings and Loan
Institutions to the Department of the Treasury 2 (Dec. 6, 1990) [hereinafter U.S. League
Comment] (comment on proposed amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations relating
to recordkeeping for funds transfers by banks; describing burden imposed on the industry by
the extra strain on staffs to meet responsibilities of new requirements). All citations to comments
in this Article are to comments to the 1990 Funds Transfer Proposal, supra note 8, unless
otherwise specified. Copies of comments cited in this article are on file with the Indiana Law
Journal; comments not cited are available from the Office of the Assistant Secretary (Enforce-
ment), Department of the Treasury, Rm. 4320, 1500 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington,
D.C., 20220. See also Banks Question Marching Orders in Drug Battle, Am. Banker, Jan. 23,
1990, at 1; Tellers Take Crime Detection 101: Banks Bear the Burden of Training Frontline
Workers to Spot Suspicious Transactions, Am. Banker, July 24, 1989, at 19; Comment Letter
from American Express Co. to the Department of the Treasury 2 (Jan. 15, 1991) [hereinafter
American Express Comment].
15. 136 CoNG. Rac. H1729 (statement of Rep. Hiler); see Comment Letter from the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to the Department of the Treasury 3 (Jan. 25,
1991) [hereinafter Federal Reserve Comment]; U.S. League Comment, supra note 14, at 2.
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approved Uniform Commercial Code Article 4A. 6 Article 4A represents the
first attempt to standardize the relationships between banks and customers
that use wholesale wire transfers as payment mechanisms both in the United
States and abroad. 17 Twenty-eight states have adopted Article 4A in the two
years since its approval. 8 In addition, Article 4A is being used by the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law as a basis for
discussion of an international convention for wire transfers. 9 Despite its
emergence as the standard reference point for funds transfers, neither
Treasury nor Congressional proposals have used Article 4A as a means of
avoiding new regulations on the funds transfer industry."
This Article seeks to stimulate discussion of the United States strategy in
policing money laundering through funds transfers. In particular, this Article
criticizes the government's intent to impose substantial additional record-
keeping and reporting burdens on the banking industry as opposed to
combating money laundering by more traditional law enforcement tech-
niques. Although this Article discusses only one of several proposed amend-
ments to the Bank Secrecy Act regulations, by analyzing key issues concerning
the 1990 Funds Transfer Proposal, this Article will illuminate the United
States' general approach to Bank Secrecy Act regulation and the rationales
and policy choices it presents.
Part I of this Article explains the special regulatory and investigatory
problems presented by funds transfers. These include the enormous volume
of daily transfers, the array of methods of effecting wire transfers, the lack
of standard formats used by the financial institutions and the various
communications systems involved in the transfers, and the effect of foreign
bank secrecy laws on collection of information about the account and the
originator or beneficiary that is outside the United States. Part II reviews
existing Bank Secrecy Act requirements that pertain to international funds
transfers and evaluates the Treasury's funds transfer proposal in light of
16. U.C.C. Article 4A (1991) (Article 4A was adopted in July 1989.).
17. No other country currently regulates funds transfers by statute. To the extent that wire
transfers have been regulated, the "regulation" has consisted of rules of the major funds
transfer systems, of the local banking associations that operate clearing houses for funds
transfers, of Federal Reserve Board Regulation J, 55 Fed. Reg. 40,801 (1990) (as amended
Oct. 5, 1990) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 210 (Subpart B)), and of Federal Reserve Board
Operating Circulars, 55 Fed. Reg. 40,801 (1990) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 210.25(c)).
18. Table of State Enactments of 1989 Amendments (Article 4A), U.C.C. Rep. Serv. State
Correlation Tables (Callaghan) xvii (Supp. Sept. 1991).
19. Lanza, Operational Aspects of Article 4A, in U.C.C. ARTICLE 4A[:] A PRACTICAL
GUIDE FOR BANEas AND BANK CoUNsEL 64 (Am. Bankers Ass'n, Greco ed. 1991). The United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law is commonly known as "UNCITRAL."
20. The October 15, 1990 revised funds transfer proposal adopts key Article 4A definitions
but did not adopt them uniformly, causing considerable controversy about the scope of several
provisions in the proposal. See infra notes 134-39 and accompanying text. The proposal
completely ignored the incentives for record retention that Article 4A provides and that are
described in Part III of this Article.
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the likely costs involved and the law enforcement benefits it could generate.
Part III describes alternative sources of highly useful information, including
the requirements of Article 4A, Regulation J, and other developments in
the funds transfer industry, with emphasis on the provisions of Article 4A
that are likely to generate additional records relating to funds transfers.
Against this background, Part IV discourages adopting new regulations for
funds transfers and recommends relying on the transfer contracts and records
already maintained or likely to exist under Article 4A. It also argues for
increased reliance on existing methods of detecting money laundering and
on international cooperation in combatting drug trafficking and money
laundering.
I. STRucTuRE OF FUNDS TRANSFERS
Funds transfers present special problems for regulators and drug enforce-
ment personnel. Some of these problems stem from the large number of
transfers made each day by United States banks and funds transfers systems. 2'
Other problems result from the lack of a uniform format in the principal
funds transfer systems and from restrictions on the characters and information
fields that can be transmitted. Still other problems relate to the ease with
which beneficial ownership of funds and other details of transfers can be
shielded through repetitive transfers outside the United States or through
foreign banks in countries with strict bank secrecy laws.? This portion of the
Article first describes funds transfers as payment mechanisms and then
discusses each of these issues in funds transfer regulation.
A. Fund Transfers as Payment Mechanisms
Fund transfers"3 involve the movement of credits from one bank to
21. See supra note 12.
22. Money Laundering in Florida, supra note 2, at 130 (statement of Larry Fuchs, Deputy
Comptroller, Office of the Florida Comptroller) (discussing laundering trail from Florida to
Switzerland); see Cox, New Path for Money Laundering: Complexity of Wire Transfers Makes
It Harder to Trace the Origins of Dirty Money, Am. Banker, July 24, 1989, at 9; Federal
Reserve Comment, supra note 15, at 4.
23. Article 4A uses the term "funds transfer" rather than "wire transfer" because transfers
may be made in writing, or by telephone, telex, or computer link. U.C.C. Article 4A Prefatory
Note (1991). Article 4A defines "funds transfer" in the industry's terms as
the series of transactions, beginning with the originator's payment order, made
for the purpose of making payment to the beneficiary of the order. The term
includes any payment order issued by the originator's bank or an intermediary
bank intended to carry out the originator's payment order. A funds transfer is
19921
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another, two features that distinguish funds transfers from other payment
mechanisms. Funds transfers may be made between domestic banks by
means of clearing houses established by banks within one locale, 2 by
Fedwire,2 or by transfers among correspondent banks by Fedwire or other
means. The term also includes funds transfers involving a bank in the
United States and a foreign bank that are communicated through SWIFT2
completed by acceptance by the beneficiary's bank of a payment order for the
benefit of the beneficiary of the originator's payment order.
U.C.C. § 4A-104(a). The class of transfers subject to Article 4A is commonly known as
"wholesale wire transfers." U.C.C. Article 4A Prefatory Note.
The terms "funds transfers" and "wire transfers" exclude two classes of transactions that
are functionally similar to funds transfers. The first of these are consumer fund transfers
under the federal Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (1988), Title
IX of the Consumer Credit Protection Act. Article 4A excludes transactions subject to EFTA.
U.C.C. § 4A-108; U.C.C. Article 4A Prefatory Note. In common EFTA transactions, a non-
bank entity such as an insurance or mortgage company initiates the transfer, which pulls from
or debits the consumer's account. The consumer has separate contracts with the non-bank
creditor and with its bank that authorize recurring debits from the consumer's account, such
as monthly mortgage payments. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693(a)(8)-(9), 1693(e).
Article 4A's "funds transfer" definition also excludes transactions through funds delivery
or transmittal systems, such as those operated by Western Union and currency exchanges.
U.C.C. § 4A-104 official comment 2. The funds transfer proposal recognizes the distinction
with its separate requirements for funds transmittals. 1989 Funds Transfer Proposal, supra
note 7, at 41,704. The originator of a funds transmittal uses cash or a check (rather than a
bank credit) as the means of settling for the funds transferred, and the party on the receiving
end of the transaction may receive cash or may have the funds credited to a bank account.
Unlike EFTA transfers and most wholesale wire transfers, the contract between the originator
and funds delivery system customarily pertains only to the individual transfer then being made.
24. J. DoLAN, supra note 10, at 388; P. OPPmENIM, INTERNATiONAL BANo 99 (4th ed.
1983). Chief among these local clearing houses is the New York Clearing House, which also
operates the funds transfer system known as CHIPS. See infra note 27 and accompanying
text; Comment Letter from the New York Clearing House to the Department of the Treasury
2 (Jan. 15, 1991) [hereinafter NYCH Comment].
25. Fedwire is a funds transfer system operated by the Federal Reserve System. It transmits
the "message" and settlement of the wire transfer occurs simultaneously. Settlements for
transferred funds occur through credits and debits of reserve accounts maintained by member
commercial banks at the Federal Reserve Bank in their districts. P. OPPENnnIM, supra note
24, at 98. Fedwire transactions are governed by Federal Reserve Board Regulation J. 12 C.F.R.
§ 210 (1990) (as amended Oct. 5, 1990). Fedwire is available as a means of settling for
international as well as for domestic wire transfers. Industry experts estimated that Fedwire
processed 63.7 million transfers in 1990 with an aggregate worth of $199 trillion. Comment
Letter from the American Bankers Association to the Department of the Treasury 5 (Jan. 15,
1991) [hereinafter American Bankers Comment]; NYCH Comment, supra note 24, at 2.
26. "SWIFT" is the acronym for the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecom-
munication, a Belgian-based association of banks established in 1977, that provides the
communications network for a large number of international funds transfers. It operates under
Belgian law. SWIFT uses one of the most comprehensive standard formats for all transfer
messages to aid processing and transmission of instructions. P. OPPENmHim, supra note 24, at
95. SWIFT's standard formats allow participating banks to link SWIFT directly to automated
processing systems in banks. Id. at 98. SWIFT is also used in intracountry transfers in a
number of countries, including the United States and Japan. Id.
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or another communications system and that are settled through CHIPS27
and the Federal Reserve System or by book entries.
28
The party initiating the transfer, the "originator," 29 pushes a credit,
usually from an account the originator holds, to a beneficiary's account. s0
Although less common, banks process transfers in which neither the origi-
nator nor the beneficiary has accounts with the banks participating in the
transfer. These funds transfers may involve originators or beneficiaries
whose deposit institutions do not have the capacity to make the funds
transfers or persons such as foreign travellers or students who do not have
accounts at the time of the transfer. 3' Funds transfers commonly involve a
series of transactions as the funds move from the originator's account to
the beneficiary's account, a series that can involve several intermediary
banks. 32
27. "CHIPS" is the acronym for the Clearing House Interbank Payments System, which
is a funds settlement system operated by the New York Clearing House. CHIPS uses the
twelve New York Clearing House member banks as well as the New York Edge Act Corpo-
rations of the two largest banks headquartered outside New York for settlements of CHIPS
transfers. Id. at 99. On each banking day in 1990, CHIPS handled an average of 148,801
transfers with an average aggregate value of $885.5 billion. NYCH Comment, supra note 24,
at 2. The New York Clearing House is revising the CHIPS message format to match SWIFT's
format with an estimated effective date of mid-1992. American Bankers Comment, supra note
25, at 11.
28. U.C.C. § 4A-209 official comment 6. In addition to funds transfers processed through
Fedwire, CHIPS, SWIFT, or other funds transfer systems or clearing houses, funds transfers
may be effected by "book entries." Comment Letter from Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of
New York to the Department of the Treasury 3 (Feb. 5, 1991) [hereinafter JPMorgan
Comment]. In funds transfers made by book entries, the originator and beneficiary have
accounts at the same bank and the transfers are made on the books of that bank. In addition,
foreign and domestic branches of the same bank communicate the details of the transfers and
settle for transferred funds through a bank-owned communications system; settlement occurs
by debits and credits (book entries) to affected accounts within the bank. Securities broker-
dealers also may use book entries to transfer shares or proceeds between buyers and sellers
who mantain accounts with the same firm.
29. U.C.C. § 4A-104(c); see also U.C.C. § 4A-104 official comment 4 (discussing types of
transfers in reference to the parties involved); Scott, Corporate Wire Transfers and the Uniform
New Payments Code, 1983 CoLum. L. Rnv. 1664, 1680.
30. U.C.C. § 4A-104 official comment 4; see also Scott, supra note 29, at 1668.
31. Comment Letter from the Bank Administration Institute to the Department of the
Treasury 10 (Jan. 22, 1991) [hereinafter BAI Comment]; Comment Letter from Chase Man-
hattan Bank to the Department of the Treasury 10-11 (Jan. 14, 1991) [hereinafter Chase
Manhattan Comment]; Comment Letter from Merchants National Bank Corporation to the
Department of the Treasury 3 (Jan. 14, 1991) [hereinafter Merchants Nat'l Comment]. In
cases in which the originator's bank lacks access to a major funds transfer system, it will
contact a bank that does. The second bank will arrange the transfer so that the proceeds reach
a bank accessible to the beneficiary or to the beneficiary's deposit institution. In such cases,
the payment order may be given by telex or by mailing a payment order together with a
cashier's check payable to the beneficiary's bank. Drug Money Laundering Control Efforts:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer and Regulatory Affairs of the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 121, 123 [hereinafter Drug
Money Laundering Control Efforts] (statement of Joseph B.H. Madison, Joseph Madison
Associates, Inc., Lanesborough, Mass.); see also U.C.C. § 4A-302(c) (allowing the receiving
bank to execute a payment order by transmitting it through first-class mall or by any other
means reasonable under the circumstances).
32. One commentator has described this series in the following way:
1992]
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A funds transfer begins when the originator gives a "payment order" to
its bank.3 3 The originator may give the payment order by telephone, by
magnetic tape, by a terminal connected to a bank computer, by telex,3 4 or,
infrequently, by completing and delivering a written instruction.35 The
originator also may transmit the payment order directly to its bank or
through an agent, a funds-transfer system,3 6 or other private communication
system.3 7 Customers who rarely use funds transfers are likely to give the
payment order in person, in writing, or by telephone.3" If the originator
telephones the bank, receiving banks customarily tape record the instruction
in its entirety to obtain a permanent record should there be a problem with
the transfer.3 9 Other customers who use funds transfers more frequently
may send a telex, deliver a magnetic tape or other electronic device directly
Suppose Corporation A orders its bank, Bank One, to transfer $1 million to the
account of Corporation B at Bank Two. Bank One debits A's account and
transmits a telex message to Middle Bank, at which Bank One has an account,
requesting it to make a transfer to Corporation B at Bank Two. Middle Bank,
in turn, debits Bank One's account and sends a telex to Bank Two requesting it
to transfer funds to Corporation B, and promising to pay by FedWire before
the end of the day.
Scott, supra note 29, at 1686.
33. Article 4A defines "payment order" as
an instruction of a sender to a receiving bank, transmitted orally, electronically,
or in writing, to pay, or to cause to pay, a fixed or determinable amount of
money to a beneficiary if:
(i) the instruction does not state a condition to payment to the beneficiary
other than time of payment,
(ii) the receiving bank is to be reimbursed by debiting an account of, or otherwise
receiving payment from, the sender, and
(iii) the instruction is transmitted by the sender directly to the receiving bank or
to an agent, funds-transfer system, or communication system for transmittal to
the receiving bank.
U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(1).
34. A telex is a hard copy sent by a service available to the general public. Scott, supra
note 29, at 1674 n.55. In funds transfers, the telex is only a method of communicating with
a bank or beneficiary; it is not a means of settling for the transferred funds. See BAI
Comment, supra note 31, at 7. Funds transfers communicated by telex cannot be processed
by computer on a "straight-through" basis but must be reformatted for entry into a computer
system for execution. Drug Money Laundering Control Efforts, supra note 31, at 116 (statement
of Joseph B.H. Madison, Joseph Madison Associates, Inc., Lanesborough, Mass.). For more
information about the use of telex in funds transfers, see Baxter & Bhala, The Interrelationship
of Article 4A with Other Law, 45 Bus. LAW. 1485, 1499 & n.80 (1990).
35. U.C.C. Article 4A Prefatory Note.
36. U.C.C. § 4A-105(a)(5). A "funds transfer system" is "a wire transfer network,
automated clearing house, or other communication system of a clearing house or other
association of banks through which a payment order by a bank may be transmitted to the
bank to which the order is addressed." Id.
37. See U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(1) (defining the term "payment order"). Payment orders must
travel directly from the originator to the receiving bank, U.C.C. §§ 4A-103(a)(iii), 4A-104
official comment 5, but they satisfy this requirement if they reach the receiving bank through
a funds transfer system. As defined by § 4A-103(a)(4), the "receiving bank" is "the bank to
which the sender's instruction is addressed."
38. BAI Comment, supra note 31, at 7.
39. U.C.C. § 4A-104 official comment 6.
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to the bank, or may send transfer instructions to the bank through an
intermediary, such as a local automated clearing house.4 If the order is
given on electronic tape, the receiving bank may retain the tape. To frequent
funds transfer users, banks may provide automated access to the bank's
internal funds transfer mechanisms.4 '
Before executing a payment order42 received other than in person, receiving
banks test the payment order for authenticity.43 In addition, the receiving
bank will "reformat" the order into a format for transmission to an
intermediary bank" or to the beneficiary's bank.45 Furthermore, in some
cases, the originator or sender sends separate payment instructions through
independent channels, such as SWIFT, to the paying bank or to the
beneficiary of the funds transfer."
Completing the funds transfer involves a series of transactions. In the
simplest of transfers, one bank holds accounts of the originator and bene-
ficiary; the bank adjusts accounts to reflect the debit of the sender's account
and the credit to the beneficiary's and notifies the beneficiary of the credit. 47
In other cases that involve only the originator's bank and the beneficiary's
40. U.C.C. § 4A-104 official comment 6. The customer sending the payment order might
retain a copy of the tape as a means of identifying unauthorized or erroneous transfers.
41. BAI Comment, supra note 31, at 7; JPMorgan Comment, supra note 28, at 4 (describing
its proprietary automated access system).
42. U.C.C. § 4A-301.
43. This testing is necessary because no signature exists to authenticate the order. P.
OPPENHEIm, supra note 24, at 89. Funds transfer systems employ other forms of security
procedures to code or test for verification: they establish a unique identifier for the customer
sending the payment order or a series of identifiers depending on the complexities of the funds
transfers made by that customer. Id. at 89-90 (describing general practices in security proce-
dures).
44. Article 4A defines an "intermediary bank" as "a receiving bank other than the
originator's bank or the beneficiary's bank." U.C.C. § 4A-104(b).
45. A "beneficiary's bank" is "the bank identified in a payment order in which an account
of the beneficiary is to be credited pursuant to the order or which otherwise is to make
payment to the beneficiary if the order does not provide for payment to an account." U.C.C.
§ 4A-103(a)(3).
46. BAI Comment, supra note 31, at 8. Separate payment instructions, which are relatively
more common in transactions originated by European banks, pose special concerns for law
enforcement agencies investigating money laundering. Comment Letter from Republic National
Bank of New York to the Department of the Treasury 3 (Jan. 11, 1991) [hereinafter Republic
Bank Comment] (explaining that these transfers are identified "by their references stating
'Cover of Direct Payment Order."'). Federal law enforcement officials cite the existence of
separate payment instructions as the justification for the proposed requirements for originators'
and beneficiaries' banks to record whatever additional payment instructions they may have
pertaining to the transfer. 55 Fed. Reg. 41,700-01 (1990) (statement of the Treasury to support
its rule).
47. In such cases, the bank will have a record of the payment order as well as records of
the debit and credit. Records of these adjustments appear both as ordinary records of funds
transfers and as entries on the account activity records maintained by the bank. U.C.C. § 4A-
406. The Treasury requires banks to retain other records. E.g., 31 C.F.R. § 103.33 (1990)
(records of payment orders for international funds transfers of $10,000 or more); 31 C.F.R.
§ 103.34 (1990) (records of direct or wire transfer deposits exceeding $100).
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bank, the receiving bank reformats the sender's payment order into a form
to send to the beneficiary's bank, sends the payment order, and settles for
the funds transferred (frequently through correspondent accounts held for
settlement purposes).
In still other cases, completing the funds transfer involves multiple banks
and, consequently, multiple payment orders. The receiving bank reformats
the originator's payment order as necessary to communicate with the inter-
mediary bank and to arrange the settlement of funds. The intermediary
bank, in turn, reformats the payment order to communicate with the next
bank (whether another intermediary bank or the beneficiary's bank), in-
structing the new bank which of the intermediary bank's accounts to debit,
and sends on the new payment order. Each communication between the
banks in the series from the originator's bank to the beneficiary's bank
entails a separate payment order.
Transfers by Fedwire operate somewhat differently. The receiving bank
executes the sender's payment order by delivering it to a Federal Reserve
Bank4" for processing. The Federal Reserve Bank, as intermediary bank,
communicates with the beneficiary's bank, and settles for the funds by
debiting and crediting the respective accounts that the originator's and
beneficiary's banks maintain with the Federal Reserve Bank. Fedwire re-
quires only the identification number of the sending bank online, the amount
to be credited, the identification numbers of the receiving bank, and the
specific account to be credited.49
Payment orders customarily contain limited information: data that are
pertinent to completion of the particular stage of the transfer involved °
and that are peculiar to the funds transfer system used. For example, the
sender's payment order to the receiving bank contains the sender's identity,
the account to be debited, the identity of the beneficiary's bank, and the
amount of the credit.5' It states the beneficiary's name or account number5 2
48. U.C.C. § 4A-206 ("Transmission of Payment Order Through Funds-Transfer or Other
Communication System"). Official comment 2 to that section explains the procedure if the
originator's payment order is transmitted to the originator's bank by means of a funds transfer
system or other third-party communication system and by means of Fedwire. U.C.C. § 4A-
206 official comment 2.
49. 136 CONG. REc. H1724 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1990) (statement of Rep. Torres). To date,
the Board of Governors has not announced any intention to expand the format of data
required to process transfers through Fedwire.
50. See U.C.C. § 4A-206 official comment 2.
51. JPMorgan Comment, supra note 28, at 7.
52. The beneficiary's name is not required to complete the transaction and apparently is
not provided in many domestic funds transfers. See NYCH Comment, supra note 24, at 14-
15. The beneficiary's name is useful in resolving questions about which account to credit with
the proceeds of the funds transfer. Article 4A, however, provides interpretive rules for cases
in which the name and account number provided refer to different beneficiaries. U.C.C. §
4A-207(b). Official comment 2 to § 4A-207 explains that "a very large percentage of payment
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and may give other instructions such as the payment date53 and routing
information.5 '
The receiving bank (now referred to as the originator's bank) gives an
order to the next bank in the sequence. That order will state the account
to be debited when the transfer is complete (which may be an account
maintained by the receiving bank with the beneficiary's bank or in a mutual
correspondent bank), the name of the beneficiary or number of the account
to be credited, 5 and the amount of the credit. If the receiving bank employs
one or more intermediary banks, the instruction to the intermediary bank
may be more cryptic: it may order the intermediary to debit its account
with the intermediary and credit the account of the beneficiary's bank and
may specify the identity of the beneficiary to be credited (by name or
account number). Each of these payment orders contains some of the
information from the previous payment order; the bank processing that step
of the transfer will add or delete information as appropriate to that step.
Consequently, an intermediary bank will have information about its pred-
ecessor and successor banks, but not about the originator or the sender.
The consequence of routing is that originators and receiving banks can
dictate certain information: the number of banks involved in the transfer,
the content of the payment orders needed to complete the transfer, and the
extent of the data that banks involved in the transfer sequence are likely
to retain.5 6 The beneficiary's bank also may know the originator's name
but is less likely to know the originator's account number57 or bank. 8
orders issued to the beneficiary's bank by another bank are processed by automated means using
machines capable of reading orders on standard formats that identify the beneficiary by an
identifying number or the number of a bank account" and that the bank completes the processing
without "human reading of the payment order itself." U.C.C. § 4A-207 official comment 2. It
remains to be seen whether Article 4A's rules on misdescription of the beneficiary will encourage
inclusion of the beneficiary's name in the information customarily contained in a payment order.
At present, SWIFT is the only funds transfer system that requires the names of both the
originator and beneficiary in the payment order. Payment orders lacking either name cannot
be executed by the SWIFT system. 136 CoNo. Rac. H1724 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1990) (statement
of Rep. Torres); see also P. OPPENxmu, supra note 24, at 97 (sample SWIFT message).
53. Section 4A-401 defines "payment date" as "the day on which the amount of the order
is payable to the beneficiary by the beneficiary's bank."
54. U.C.C. § 4A-302(b). Banks typically capture and retain the originator's identity, amount
of the transfer, execution date, payment instructions, and name of the beneficiary's bank.
JPMorgan Comment, supra note 28, at 7.
55. The originator may not know the beneficiary's account number at the time of its
payment order. It also is possible that the beneficiary has no account. Federal Reserve Comment,
supra note 15, at 29.
56. This option renders more expensive the task of capturing sufficient data to track those
transfers related to money laundering because it requires more sophisticated matching of the
paths of the transfers. U.C.C. § 4A-302 official comment 1.
57. Most banks consider the account number of the originator to be proprietary infor-
mation, which they protect for security reasons. E.g., JPMorgan Comment, supra note 28, at
1; see Comment Letter from The Sumitomo Bank, Ltd. to the Department of the Treasury I
(Dec. 24, 1990) [hereinafter Sumitomo Comment].
58. U.C.C. § 4A-104(d) ('Originator's bank' means (i) the receiving bank to which the
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The beneficiary's bank has two options on receipt of the payment order:
it may reject a payment order (for example, if the beneficiary named has
no account), or it may "accept" the transfer. 9 If the beneficiary bank
"accepts" the transfer,6° it credits the account specified, notifies the bene-
ficiary,6' and makes the credit available to the beneficiary either when
settlement occurs or on the payment date specified in the payment order. 2
The bank's acceptance of the payment order triggers debits that ultimately
reach the originator's account and (unless the payment order requires notice
to the beneficiary) generally is the last act necessary to make the transfer
"final" as between originator and beneficiary.63
B. Mechanical Issues in Tracing Drug Proceeds
Through Funds Transfers
The particular manner in which banks maintain records of funds transfers
makes the task of examining these transactions for law enforcement purposes
a daunting one at best. This problem is exacerbated, as noted previously,
payment order of the originator is issued if the originator is not a bank .... "). In transfers
involving banks other than the originator's and beneficiary's banks, each bank pushes a credit
forward to the next bank in the sequence and relies on the ability to collect that credit once
the beneficiary's bank "accepts" the payment order on behalf of the beneficiary. See U.C.C.
§ 4A-302(a)-(b) and official comment 2.
59. U.C.C. §§ 4A-209(c), 4A-210, 4A-212. The beneficiary's bank may reject a payment
order by notifying the originator of its rejection. U.C.C. § 4A-210(a). It must do so before
acceptance occurs. U.C.C. § 4A-209(b)(2)-(3).
60. U.C.C. § 4A-209 ("Acceptance of Payment Order").
61. Notice to the beneficiary is required unless excused by agreement, by the payment order,
or by a funds transfer system or clearing house association rule. U.C.C. § 4A-404(b)-(c).
62. U.C.C. § 4A-401.
63. Acceptance of the payment order by the beneficiary's bank is a key event in the funds
transfer. Ballen and Diana describe its effect:
If the beneficiary's bank accepts a payment order, the bank generally must pay
the beneficiary the amount of the order on the payment date. ...
The beneficiary may recover consequential damages if the bank refuses to pay
the beneficiary after the beneficiary has demanded payment and notified the bank
of the special circumstances that will give rise to the consequential damages which
will result from nonpayment and of the general type or nature of the damages
that will be suffered as a result of such nonpayment and their general magnitude.
However, the bank will not be liable for consequential damages if the bank proves
that it did not pay because of a reasonable doubt concerning the right of the
beneficiary to the payment.... Reasonable doubt also could occur if there is
doubt about whether the person demanding payment is the person identified in
the payment order as the beneficiary of the [payment] order.
Ballen & Diana, Duties of the Beneficiary's Bank, 45 Bus. LAW. 1467, 1468-69 (1990) (citations
omitted).
[Vol. 67:283
POLICING MONEY LAUNDERING
by the high volume of transfers which occur daily-350,0O0 through Fedwire
and CHIPS alone, plus additional transfers outside these systems, such as
by telex and book entries. 64
Aside from the limited information contained in payment orders, banks
maintain records of all funds transfers they process for customers. 6 But
banks at different stages of the funds transfer possess data related only to
that portion with which they are involved.66 Originators' banks have data,
such as cross-references to outstanding letters of credit,67 that are unavailable
to other participants in the funds transfer. Beneficiaries' banks likewise
have data on the beneficiary that are unavailable to other banks in the
funds transfer. Thus, there is no lack of records, but because information
is kept in separate locations throughout and after the transaction, each
record would have to be located and examined to create a complete trail
of the funds transfer. For example, in a two-bank funds transfer, each
bank has a record that relates to the transfer; in a three-bank transfer (one
involving the originator's bank, an intermediary bank or Fedwire, and the
beneficiary's bank), each bank likewise has a record, for a total of three
records, and each bank's records contain only some of the detail relating
to the transfer. The real issue in tracing drug proceeds through money
laundering, therefore, is located in the volume of records that banks have. 61
The task of tracing laundered drug proceeds is further complicated by
the message formats employed in the major funds transfer systems. As
explained previously,69 funds transfer systems restrict the number and type
of characters used to communicate key information about the transaction.70
Accordingly, when the receiving bank reformats the sender's payment order
64. Supra notes 12 and 28.
65. As described above, these records may consist of a copy of a payment order delivered
in writing, a recording of a telephone instruction, a magnetic tape or other device, or a
computer record of an instruction transmitted directly by the sender to the receiving bank's
computer. Receiving banks have internal guidelines concerning the period for which each
maintains records of payment orders. See American Bankers Comment, supra note 25, at 2;
Chase Manhattan Comment, supra note 31, at 4. In addition, statements of demand account
activity (whether debits or credits) show funds transfer activity for each account; these records
contain the date of the debit or credit, the amount, and the reference number that the bank
assigned to the transfer. Comment Letter from Marshall & Insley Bank to the Department of
the Treasury 1 (Jan. 9, 1991) [hereinafter Marshall & Insley Comment].
66. Drug Money Laundering Control Efforts, supra note 31, at 75 (statement of John F.
Lee, President, New York Clearing House Association).
67. See Comment Letter of Mayfair Bank to the Department of the Treasury I (Nov. 28,
1990).
68. E.g., Chase Manhattan Comment, supra note 31, at 3-4.
69. See supra notes 37-43.
70. These restrictions relate to the compatibility of sending and receiving banks' computers
and support fully automated processing of payment orders, which increases the speed and
reliability with which they can be processed, and protects the system from unauthorized users.
E.g., JPMorgan Comment, supra note 28, at 4; see Comment Letter from Citicorp to the
Department of the Treasury 3, 9 (Jan. 15, 1991) [hereinafter Citicorp Comment II].
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for transmission to the next bank in sequence, format and space consider-
ations may force it to omit information supplied by the sender (such as the
originator's identity) that is not essential to the intermediary bank's role in
the transfer .7 The intermediary bank, in turn, may omit data not essential
to the next stage of the transfer.7 2 These field restrictions effectively preserve
the anonymity of the originator and beneficiary from other participants in
the funds transfer.73
Another practical problem for law enforcement personnel evolves from
the highly specialized nature of these formats. Because the formats of the
major funds transfer systems differ,7 4 so that only someone trained to read
each system can decipher the contents of its records, federal law enforcement
officials refer to the burden of locating multiple records and of deciphering
nonstandard format entries to justify their interest in the additional record-
keeping requirements sought in the funds transfer proposal.7 5
C. Ability to Obscure Beneficial Ownership of Transferred Funds
Funds transfers and foreign bank secrecy laws offer money launderers an
easy means of obscuring the beneficial ownership of funds transferred and
received. Funds transfers generally are processed by electronic means and
are handled more speedily and safely than traditional paper-based payment
mechanisms, such as checks and bank drafts. International funds transfers
are particularly suitable for money laundering because it is possible to route
a transfer through a foreign bank account that is protected by a strict bank
secrecy law or through a series of accounts so protected. 76 In addition, the
originator or sender may send a payment order through the CHIPS and
Fedwire funds transfer systems that does not identify the originator-or, in
a CHIPS transfer, that identifies the originator as "one of our customers.'" 7
71. For example, the receiving bank could omit any routing instructions, as well as the
sender's account number, not required by the intermediary bank.
72. At this stage, for example, the intermediary bank may omit the number identifying
the originator's bank.
73. Drug Money Laundering Control Efforts, supra note 31, at 71-81, 89-132 (statements
of John F. Lee, President, New York Clearing House Association, and Joseph B.H. Madison,
Joseph Madison Associates, Inc., Lanesborough, Mass., respectively).
74. See supra notes 10, 25-27 and accompanying text.
75. 1990 Funds Transfer Proposal, supra note 8, at 41,696; 1989 Funds Transfer Proposal,
supra note 7, at 45,769.
76. E.g., 134 CONG. REc. 30,737 (1988) (statement of Sen. Kerry); id. at 30,771-72
(reprinting U.S. Customs Service Documents); Republic Bank Comment, supra note 46, at 3;
U.S. League Comment, supra note 14, at 2.
77. Drug Money Laundering Control Efforts, supra note 31, at 95 (statement of Joseph
B.H. Madison, Joseph Madison Associates, Inc., Lanesborough, Mass.). In addition, if formats
were changed to accomodate "on-whose-behalf" information, one comment explained that
"[a] client could simply insert 'XXX' or 'N/A' in the relevant mandatory field, and systems
in place today would recognize such characters as fulfilling the requirement to provide
information in a mandatory field and process the payment order." JPMorgan Comment, supra
note 28, at 8; see Chase Manhattan Comment, supra note 31, at 5.
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As a consequence, law enforcement agencies encounter a very different
burden in tracing the proceeds of money laundering through funds transfers
than through paper-based payment systems.
II. EVALUATION OF FUrrs TRANSFER PROPOSAL
Under the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970,78
the Treasury has gained increasing authority to require banks and other
financial institutions79 to maintain records and make reports that have special
utility in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings. The
Treasury has promulgated regulations80 that require institutions to file reports
of domestic and foreign financial transactions of all types and to maintain
records of other transactions. The primary purpose of these requirements
is to identify the sources, volumes, and movements of monies moving into
and out of the country and through domestic financial institutions.
Until recent years, law enforcement and regulatory efforts focused on
cash deposits and transactions in which cash was exchanged for currency
equivalents such as money orders and travelers' and tellers' checks. 81 These
efforts altered the methods used by money launderers: they first broke their
domestic cash transactions into sums of less than $10,000 so that they
would trigger no reporting.82 Money launderers apparently found it easier
to carry suitcases of cash out of the country,83 deposit the cash in foreign
banks, and retrieve the proceeds through wire transfers. 4
78. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 114 (1970) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 321,
5311-5314, 5316-5322 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989).
79. The terms "bank" and "financial institution" are defined in 31 C.F.R. § 103.11
(1990).
80. 31 C.F.R. § 103 (1990).
81. Treasury regulations require a "currency transaction report" (also known as "CTR"
or "IRS Form 4789") for each deposit, withdrawal, exchange of currency, or other payment
or transfer that involves a physical transfer of currency of $10,000 or more. See 31 C.F.R. §
103.22(a) (1990). Banks and other financial institutions may exempt certain classes of customers
(typically restaurants) from these reporting requirements without special permission from the
Internal Revenue Service. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22. In recent years, banks and financial institutions
(including businesses such as automobile and jewelry dealers, real estate brokers, and title
companies) filed approximately six million currency transaction reports each year. See 55 Fed.
Reg. 36,663, 36,664 (Treasury estimate).
82. Structuring cash transactions into sums of less than $10,000 to avoid reporting require-
ments is a practice known as "smurfing." It has attracted considerable attention from scholars.
E.g., Welling, Smurfs, Money Laundering, and the Federal Criminal Law: The Crime of
Structuring Transactions, 41 U. FLA. L. Rnv. 287 (1989).
83. Money Laundering: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervi-
sion, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 123-24 (1989) [hereinafter Money Laundering] (statement of Terrence
M. Burke, Acting Deputy Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration).
84. Money launderers devised elaborate schemes for washing drug proceeds. Among the
most elaborate was a scheme developed by a Columbian drug ring that deposited with Bank
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As banks began to report patterns of smaller cash transactions and as
evidence revealed that money launderers were using new methods,,5 the
Treasury proposed a series of additional reporting and recordkeeping re-
quirements designed both to create a paper trail of the movements of drug
proceeds and to deter money launderers from using domestic banking
transactions in money laundering. s6 The 1990 Funds Transfer Proposal is
one of that series.
The additional reporting and recordkeeping requirements implemented or
proposed in 1990 have prompted bankers and other financial service prov-
iders to complain that there is no cohesive strategy for overseeing money
launderers' use of banks."8 In addition, they argue that the costs associated
of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI)'s Tampa branch, -wired those funds to the
United Kingdom and elsewhere abroad, and invested them in certificates of deposit that then
secured loans made by a bank in a haven country in the Caribbean and elsewhere, and finally
wired the loan proceeds back to a BCCI account in Tampa. 134 CONG. REc. 30,771-72 (1988)
(reprinting U.S. Customs Service release); see also Money Laundering in Florida, supra note
2, at 129-30 (1989) (statement of Larry Fuchs, Deputy Comptroller, Office of the Florida
Comptroller, describing laundering trail from Florida to Switzerland).
85. For example, Mark M. Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,
Department of Justice, testified:
While we no longer are seeing the volume of drug traffickers arriving openly at
teller's windows with suitcases filled with cash, buying stacks of $9,000 cashiers
checks, we are seeing a wide variety of new schemes involving wire transfers,
legitimate businesses, flight capital from abroad, and so forth.
Money Laundering Legislation, supra note 10, at 13; see also 134 CoNo. Rac. at S16,026-27
(daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (describing a shift in lhte 1987 from selling checks on the black
market to a complex series of transactions in which funds were transferred via New York to
BCCI Luxembourg and placed in a certificate of deposit in BCCI's London bank, which
guaranteed a loan from BCCI in Nassau, the proceeds of which were then wired back to
Tampa).
86. In 1990, the Treasury implemented and proposed other new regulations. Those imple-
mented included revised Currency Transaction Reports, 55 Fed. Reg. 1021 (1990); amendments
to geographic targeting orders first adopted in 1989 (54 Fed. Reg. 33,675, 33,679 (1989)
(proposed Aug. 16, 1989)), 54 Fed. Reg. 34,976 (1990); and the so-called $3,000 rule, an
Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations Relating to Identification Required to
Purchase Bank Checks and Drafts, Cashier's Checks, Money Orders and Travelers' Checks,
55 Fed. Reg. 20,139 (1990) (implementing Section 6185(b) of Title VI of the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered
titles of U.S.C.)), which prohibits the sale of instruments in amounts of $3,000 or more unless
the financial institution verifies and records the identity of purchaser.
The proposed regulations include the funds transfer proposals, 1989 Funds Transfer Proposal,
supra note 7, and 1990 Funds Transfer Proposal, supra note 8, and the notice of proposed
rulemaking dealing with mandatory aggregation of currency transactions and mandatory
magnetic media reporting of Currency Transaction Reports, 55 Fed. Reg. 36,663 (1990) (to be
codified at 31 C.F.R. § 103) (proposed Sept. 6, 1990).
87. The proposed amendments also cover funds transmittals, which are made by non-bank
financial institutions. The Treasury also expressed interest in additional regulation of funds
transfers, particularly in reporting requirements. 1990 Funds Transfer Proposal, supra note 8,
at 41,697.
88. A substantial number of the 331 comments filed in response to the 1990 Funds Transfer
Proposal objected to the lack of overall regulatory strategy. E.g., Comment Letter from
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with bank secrecy compliance are "spiraling" 9 and that the costs associated
with implementing the current "piecemeal" approach9° to bank secrecy
regulation far exceed the usefulness of the reports and records they pro-
duce. 9' Several commentators on the 1990 Funds Transfer Proposal argued
that because most of the information sought under the proposal is already
embedded in existing funds transfer formats and is retained under existing
Bank Secrecy Act regulations, the Treasury's proposal must seek to reduce
the information to a uniform format for the sake of "retrievability," a
procedure that one commentator described as "one stop shopping" for law
enforcement officials. 92
This portion of the Article describes existing recordkeeping requirements
for funds transfers. It also evaluates the Treasury's 1990 Funds Transfer
Proposal in terms of the Bank Secrecy Act's "utility" standard, the regu-
latory burden it would impose on the wire transfer industry, and the
extraterritorial problems it leaves unanswered. It concludes that the proposed
recordkeeping requirements would impose significant additional costs on
financial institutions and other wire transfer industry members without
yielding information that would be highly useful in law enforcement pro-
ceedings.93
A. Existing Regulation of Funds Transfers
Under the Bank Secrecy Act
Existing federal regulations require banks and other financial institutions
to maintain and retain for five years records of all funds transfers from or
to the United States in which the amount transferred is $10,000 or more.94
Banking regulations also require banks to maintain records of all direct and
wire transfer deposits of $100 or more. 9
Citicorp to the Department of the Treasury 2 (Dec. 5, 1990) [hereinafter Citicorp Comment
I] (responding to the Sept. 6, 1990 proposal requiring mandatory media reporting of certain
financial institutions; objecting in particular to an apparent absence of strategy for using new
raw data to be created by banks).
89. American Bankers Comment, supra note 25, at 6-7; see Treasury Issues Wire Transfer
Proposal as Bankers Blast Latest Industry Burden, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 549
(Oct. 22, 1990); Banks Fear Big Burden in New Rules on Wires, Am. Banker, Oct. 3, 1990,
at 1.
90. See Citicorp Comment II, supra note 70, at 2; NYCH Comment, supra note 24, at 6.
91. See American Bankers Comment, supra note 25, at 6; Citicorp Comment I, supra note
86, at 2; JPMorgan Comment, supra note 28, at 11; NYCH Comment, supra note 24, at 7.
92. Citicorp Comment II, supra note 70, at 10.
93. The Bank Secrecy Act authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate regula-
tions to provide information on wire transfers that would have a "high degree of utility" in
criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations. Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat.
114 (1970).
94. 31 C.F.R. § 103.33 (1990). The current regulation does not specify the precise records
that banks must maintain with respect to these transfers.
95. 31 C.F.R. § 103.34.
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In their comments on the funds transfer proposal, bankers point out that
they make records of all international funds transfers,9 although the form
of the record depends in part on the means by which the payment order
reached the receiving bank. In addition to records specific to the payment
orders banks receive and execute, they also have back-up records of trans-
fers, such as records of demand account activity that show the date of the
execution of the transfer, a transaction reference number, and the amount
of the transfer.9 7 Bankers maintain that they have had no trouble responding
to subpoenas from law enforcement agencies" and that they usually have
information sufficient to enable trained investigators to trace the trail of
the funds transferred.9
In addition to their duty to maintain records of international transfers
and deposits, banks have an obligation to report any known or suspected
criminal activity. 1°° Banks also must respond to targeting orders from the
Treasury Department to record and report on certain types of transactions
with foreign financial agencies.10'
B. Regulatory Burdens of the Funds Transfer Proposal
The funds transfer proposal, if adopted, would add significantly to the
burden of existing Bank Secrecy Act requirements. Many funds transfer
industry members and experts see it as a threat to the efficiency of the
funds transfer systems in the United States. 1°2
In addition to the generalized burdens associated with any new regula-
tion, 103 the funds transfer proposal would impose four different burdens on
banks' funds transfer businesses. These burdens relate to (1) the technical
capacity of current funds transfer systems and internal bank computers that
interact with those systems; 104 (2) the interruption of the funds transfer
96. See, e.g., BAI Comment, supra note 31, at 2; Chase Manhattan Comment, supra note
31, at 4. For example, the Bank Administration Institute explained that most wire systems
maintain records of transactions for six months, which are thereafter stored in "offline" copy.
BAI Comment, supra note 31, at 11.
97. Supra note 65 and accompanying text. These records are required for error resolution
and complement records of items processed for compliance with the requirements of state laws
on bank collection. U.C.C. § 4A-406 (1991); see Chase Manhattan Comment, supra note 31,
at 3.
98. E.g., Chase Manhattan Comment, supra note 31, at 4.
99. Id.
100. 12 C.F.R. § 21.11 (1991). Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Banking Circular
227 describes the requirements and procedures for reporting suspected criminal activity. 1
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 11,635 (Feb. 7, 1990).
101. 31 C.F.R. § 103.25 (1990).
102. E.g., JPMorgan Comment, supra note 28, at 3-5.
103. See Federal Reserve Comment, supra note 15, at 7.
104. Two phases of adjustments would be necessary to enhance the technical capacity to
capture and retain information called for by the funds transfer proposal-revising and up-
grading the message formats of the major funds transfer systems (CHIPS, Fedwire, and
SWIFT) and rendering individual banks' computers compatible with those systems.
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process by necessary manual intervention; (3) the loss of international funds
transfer commerce and encouragement of offshore netting; and (4) compli-
ance costs associated with ambiguous requirements. These burdens are in
addition to the cumulative and impending impositions of other requirements
under the Bank Secrecy Act regulations. 05
The funds transfer proposal would require banks to capture and retain
information beyond the capacity of existing automated funds transfer sys-
tems. As a result, banks would have to reformat or acquire automated
systems capable of retaining and retrieving data required by the proposal
and would incur related training and storage costs.
Industry experts estimate that these costs would be sizeable' °6 and that
implementing these requirements would be especially time-consuming.' °7 For
example, of the three principal funds transfer communications formats
(SWIFT, CHIPS, and Fedwire), none currently has sufficient capacity to
comply with the funds transfer proposal.e°8 Only SWIFT's message contains
most of the information required of originators' banks under the proposal:'09
it conveys the identity of the originator and its account number, the identity
of the beneficiary (but not the beneficiary's account number), the payment
date, the amount of the transfer, the identities of the banks involved in the
transfer (including the intermediary bank), and payment details. SWIFT,
like the CHIPS and Fedwire communications formats, omits the name of
the person "on whose behalf" the originator is acting." 0
105. Supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
106. Industry experts have estimated the total costs for the first year at $200 million. BAI
Comment, supra note 31, at 5. This figure is far in excess of the amount that triggers a
Regulatory Impact Analysis under Executive Order 12,291. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3
C.F.R. § 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601, at 473 (1988). The American Bankers
Association more modestly estimates the start-up costs for the commercial banking industry
(not including others affected by the 1990 proposal) in the range of $120 to $200 million.
American Bankers Comment, supra note 25, at 7.1 107. Money Laundering Legislation, supra note 10, at 15-16 (statement of Clyde H. Farn-
sworth, Jr., Director, Division of Federal Reserve Bank Operations, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System).
108. NYCH Comment, supra note 24, at 16.
109. See generally 1990 Funds Transfer Proposal, supra note 8, at 41,703 (detailing the
information required by the proposal). SWIFT's fields are not mandatory, and at least one
expert has suggested that they would have to be made mandatory to meet the requirements of
the proposal. Comment Letter from the Boston Clearing House Association to the Department
of the Treasury 4 (Jan. 11, 1991) [hereinafter BCHA Comment]. The BCHA Comment points
to an irony in designating mandatory fields for SWIFT messages: foreign banks will be
"prohibited by their country's [sic] laws from supplying the required information." Id. For a
sample SWIFT format, see JPMorgan Comment, supra note 28, Exhibit A. For more
information about field components of SWIFT messages, see J. DoIAN, supra note 10, at 390-
91; P. Oppmmm, supra note 24, at 95-98.
110. 1990 Funds Transfer Proposal, supra note 8, at 41,703. The proposal contains limited
exceptions to this requirement, such as transfers originated by publicly traded corporations,
public utilities, and government agencies. Id.
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Fedwire and CHIPS each omit different items required by the proposed
regulation. Fedwire has the least comprehensive message format, requiring
only identification of the banks participating in the Fedwire transaction,"'
the amount of the transfer, and the beneficiary's account number. It allows
little in terms of the amount and types of third-party and other information
not essential to completion of the payment and tolerates anonymity of the
originator and beneficiary.Y2 The Federal Reserve Board has not proposed
a modification to accommodate the third-party information contemplated
by the funds transfer proposal."3 CHIPS messages contain information that
111. See Drug Money Laundering Control Efforts, supra note 31, at 101-02 (statement of
Joseph B.H. Madison, Joseph Madison Associates, Inc., Lanesborough, Mass.). A Fedwire
message identifies parties in a structured sequence that customarily begins with the "Fed
Sending Bank" (bank connected to Fedwire that sends the message) and may end with the
"Fed Receiving Bank" (bank connected to Fedwire that receives the message). Id. at 124-26.
These transactions rely on the originator's and beneficiary's banks to maintain data necessary
to reconstruct the transfer in the event of error. In transactions in which the Fed Receiving
Bank does not hold the last account to be credited in the funds transfer, Fedwire requires
numeric identification (based on codes developed by the American Bankers Association) of
the intermediary bank (the bank credited by the Fed Receiving Bank), beneficiary's bank (bank
that credits the account of the beneficiary), and beneficiary (required if' - separate beneficiary's
bank is specified). Id. at 125. Neither the originator nor beneficiary need be identified by
name. Id. at 90.
112. Fedwire's existing message format contains space for the identity of the originator and
beneficiary but requires neither before entry of a transfer; the format has no field for what
the funds transfer industry calls "by order" information (the equivalent of the identity of the
beneficial owner of the funds transferred). See Drug Money Laundering Control Efforts, supra
note 31, at 101-02. The Boston Clearing House Association estimates that Fedwire would have
to add a line to accommodate these as mandatory information-a change that it describes as
a "very significant" undertaking. BCHA Comment, supra note 109, at 4. The American
Bankers Association, comparing Fedwire's limited message capacity with the requirements of
the proposal, observed that requiring Fedwire to designate one of the fields in its existing
format for new information
might jeopardize the field's current usage for regular commercial purposes by
precluding routine instruction information. If this is the case, extensive modifi-
cations of Fedwire might be necessary to fully accommodate such information
(e.g., by adopting a SWIFT format). These modifications would be costly to the
Federal Reserve, and thus be reflected in increased Fedwire prices borme by the
privdte sector. Such extensive modifications to the Fedwire format would also
require each online Fedwire bank to modify, at great cost, its interface with
Fedwire and perhaps even dissuade offline Fedwire banks from seeking online
connections. Finally, it is likely that such modifications could be made to Fedwire
only over a period of 24 to 36 months.
American Bankers Comment, supra note 25, at 11; see also Marshall & Insley Comment,
supra note 65, at 1-2 (bank retains data only in Fedwire format and generally has no beneficiary
data when acting as originator's bank or data on originator when acting as beneficiary's bank).
113. NYCH Comment, supra note 24, at 16. One industry expert observed that changing
the Fedwire format, for example, by making optional data mandatory or by requiring names
as well as numeric identifiers (as would be required by the funds transfer proposal), would
involve considerable time and expense and that the Federal Reserve Board might have to
provide an opportunity for public comment before it could implement such a change. BCHA
Comment, supra note 109, at 4; see American Bankers Comment, supra note 25, at 11.
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is similar to Fedwire messages." 4 The CHIPS format, however, will have
the capacity to comply with all aspects of the funds transfer proposal except
the "on-whose-behalf" information by mid-1992. 15
To magnify the burden of capturing additional information, originators'
banks would be required to obtain this information "prior to the initiation
of the first payment order."'1 6 As a consequence, originators' banks would
need the capability of separating those incoming payment orders that
contained all required information, such as the "on-behalf-of" information,
from those that lacked it. This capability would require additional computer
capacity and impose a second burden-manual intervention."'
114. CHIPS messages currently must identify the sending CHIPS participant ("Send Bank"),
the receiving CHIPS participant ("Receive Bank"), and the account to be credited by the
Receive Bank ("Receive Account"). Drug Money Laundering Control Efforts, supra note 31,
at 121. The message format also permits inclusion of the identities of the originator's bank
(the "OGB"), the bank instructing the CHIPS participant to make the transfer (the "INS"),
and the customer of the CHIPS participant ("Send Account"). Id. The identities of the
originator's bank and the bank instructing the CHIPS participant to make the transfer are
frequently omitted. Id.
115. NYCH Comment, supra note 24, at 16; see American Bankers Comment, supra note
25, at 11. The requirement that the originator's bank inquire about the identity of anyone
"on-whose-behalf" the originator is acting is one of the most controversial provisions in the
funds transfer proposal. See generally 1990 Funds Transfer Proposal, supra note 8, at 41,703
(discussing the requirement).
116. 1990 Funds Transfer Proposal, supra note 8, at 41,703.
117. The problems presented by manual intervention are discussed at notes 120-28 and
accompanying text. One commentator explained the special burden of this requirement on
originators' banks:
In order for Morgan to obtain this information from non-exempt originators
before executing a payment order, changes to both proprietary software systems
as well as interbank transfer systems must be made. Changes to formats used in
non-electronic or non-automated means of making payments [sic] instructions
must also be made....
Even if such system changes are made, because beneficial interest information
is not critical to the routing of a payment order, a customer's payment [order]
need not necessarily contain applicable beneficial interest information in order to
be processed on an automated basis. A client could simply insert "XXX" or
"N/A" in the relevant mandatory field, and systems in place today would
recognize such characters as fulfilling the requirement to provide information in
a mandatory field and process the payment order. A payment order could be
transmitted to or further transmitted or applied by an intermediary bank or the
beneficiary's bank without "real" information in this field.
If Treasury intends an originator's bank actually to verify the existence or
non-existence of information relating to the party on whose behalf the originator
is initiating a payment, then an originating bank's funds transfer system must be
programmed to reject any payment order which is not originated by an exempt
entity, "a publicly traded corporation." ... In other words, many payments
which previously would have been processed in 60 seconds or less on a straight-
through basis [would have to be] handled manually, a process which could take
up to several days.... Even payments which are processed manually today
would require additional manual processing.
JPMorgan Comment, supra note 28, at 8; see NYCH Comment, supra note 24, at 10-11.
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Beneficiaries' banks similarly would be required to capture and retain, in
addition to the name and account number of the beneficiary, the name of
the person on whose behalf the funds transfer was received, if different
from the beneficiary, unless the beneficiary is a publicly traded corporation,
public utility, or government agency, and the name of the originator of the
payment order and the account number, if applicable and known by the
beneficiary." 8 The beneficiary's bank would have to obtain this information
within fifteen days after the payment of the funds transfer to the benefi-
ciary. 119 This requirement would necessitate compliance expenditures for
beneficiaries' banks similar to those that originator's banks would incur,
viz., acquiring new computer equipment and software, retraining personnel,
and expanding storage capacity.
The second type of burden that the proposal would-impose on originators'
and beneficiaries' banks results from the elimination of existing efficiencies
of the automated systems. Those portions of the proposal that would require
banks to obtain data about parties to the transfer not communicated by
standard message formats would eliminate the industry's ability to process
many funds transfers on a "straight-through basis."' 20 Instead of processing
118. 1990 Funds Transfer Proposal, supra note 8, at 41,703.
119. Id. The obligation on the beneficiary's bank to obtain from the beneficiary information
omitted from the payment order requires the beneficiary's bank to recognize and segregate
incomplete payment orders, contact the beneficiary, match any response made by the beneficiary
with the corresponding record of the incoming transfer or remind the beneficiary of her failure
to respond, and, where it receives no response, record the names, addresses, and account
numbers of "those persons originating funds transfers on which there is incomplete informa-
tion." Id. Some commentators observed that it would be impossible to guarantee receipt of
information within 15 days, thus increasing substantially the numbers of transactions that
would be on the list of those containing incomplete information, as required under the
proposal. American Bankers Comment, supra note 25, at 12 (also describing steps necessary
to obtain the information required by proposed section 103.33(e)(2)(ii)(A)(2)); see also Federal
Reserve Comment, supra note 15, at 10 (discussing the steps necessary for the beneficiary
bank's collection of this information); NYCH Comment, supra note 24, at 11 (discussing the
15-day requirement and doubting banks' ability to obtain the "on-whose-behalf" information
regardless of the time period permitted).
120. JPMorgan Comment supra note 28, at 4-5. The comment explains that JPMorgan
processes more than 60% of all payment orders or funds transfers it handles on
a straight-through basis .... [There is no need for a Morgan employee to
examine, repair or route these transfers. More than 80% of the payment orders
transmitted to Morgan by clients by means of our proprietary computerized
funds-transfer system are processed on a straight-through basis. Straight-through
processing is made possible by the use of computer-generated payment orders,
creating compatible interfaces between data processing systems, standard formats
and sophisticated telecommunications technology....
This type of automated processing is common to the industry and to large
providers of these services. It is one of the great strengths of the United States
large dollar, or wholesale payments system and one reason that U.S. dollar
denominated funds transfers continue to be the settlement means of choice in
international commerce. The speed, accuracy, sophistication, security and low
cost to the user of the U.S. payments systems contribute to maintaining this role
for the U.S. dollar and in maintaining on-shore dollar clearing and settlements.
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the payment order by wholly automated means, the proposal would require
originators' and beneficiaries' banks to perform manual checks of many
payment orders for completeness .12  One commentator explained that al-
though many data can be verified on an automated basis information such
as the name of the originator cannot be verified automatically because
existing technologies checking for alphabetical entries "would not reveal an
originator listed as 'on behalf of our good customer' or 'Mickey Mouse." '" 22
Once a beneficiary's bank identifies an incomplete payment order, it must
request the missing information from the beneficiary (who is usually an
account holder).'2 Although the automated system processing the incoming
payment order may be programmed to send the beneficiary a notice of the
receipt of the transfer (called a credit advice), the system may not be able
to include the request for information in the same notice for timing reasons:
the necessity of a request arises only after manual determination.12 In
addition, the beneficiary's bank would have to implement for matching
information received from the beneficiary with the original record of the
incoming payment order. This means that the bank would not only have
to be capable of locating the record of the incoming payment order by its
reference number but also of placing the missing information in the proper
position in the record. The method could be manual or automated.2' Should
the beneficiary fail to respond-which he or she would be very likely to
do, according to industry experts,'-the beneficiary's bank would be
required to initiate a follow-up notice or call, requiring both a means of
triggering the follow-up and of tracking the response. A beneficiary's bank
that did not follow up would have failed to make a reasonable effort to
obtain the on-whose-behalf information, as required under the proposal. 27
121. The originator's bank must collect this information before originating the first payment
order "unless the originator is a publicly traded corporation, public utility or government
agency." 1990 Funds Transfer Proposal, supra note 8, at 41,703. Although this appears to
exclude a substantial number of transfers, commentators do not agree.
In addition, the New York Clearing House pointed to the fact that the only situations in
which the originator's bank could readily obtain the on-behalf-of information were those
payment orders that the originator telephoned in and those that the originator made in person
at a branch. NYCH Comment, supra note 23, at 10. It also estimated that this proposal would
mandate manual intervention in "ten times the number of cases in which it is presently
required." Id.
122. BAI Comment, supra note 31, at 9.
123. 1990 Funds Transfer Proposal, supra note 8, at 41,703.
124. See BAI Comment, supra note 31, at 9. Other commentators foresee the likelihood
that the beneficiary's bank would have to solicit the missing information by telephone.
Comment Letter from the Institute of International Bankers to the Department of the Treasury
5 (Jan. 15, 1991) [hereinafter Inst. Int'l Bankers Comment].
125. See BAI Comment, supra note 31, at 10.
126. NYCH Comment, supra note 24, at 11. NYCH members estimated that "at least 75
percent" of the beneficiaries would fail to respond to the initial request. Id.
127. 1990 Funds Transfer Proposal, supra note 8, at 41,703.
1992]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
The bank finally must maintain a listing of those transfers for which it did
not obtain the missing information from the beneficiary.
2 8
A third burden of the proposal is the loss of funds transfer business that
the industry expects following adoption and the projected effect on the
United States government securities market both from the loss of efficiency
in the funds transfer systems and from the proposed extension of record-
keeping requirements to book entries. 2 9 At this point, straight-through
processing still offers substantial efficiencies in terms of speed, accuracy,
and security 30 and is considered by many in the'funds transfer industry to
be the reason that so many international trade transactions have been dollar-
denominated.' The new regulations could change this situation rapidly.
One commentator explained that "[h]uman intervention in the automated
funds transfer process would result in a dramatic increase in funds transfer
costs to the U.S. banking industry and its customers, a slowing of domestic
and international payments, and a general disruption of legitimate world
trade."'13 2 This view was supported by many in the funds transfer industry. 3
The final type of regulatory burden relates to provisions that the industry
considers ambiguous. Such provisions raise the costs of complying with any
new regulation'3 4 and also increase the regulated industry's anxiety about
prosecution. 3 For the most part, industry concerns of this type relate to
definitions of key terms such as "originator's bank," "intermediary bank,"
and "payment order" and to the proposal that beneficiaries' banks obtain
information to complete their records with respect to the funds transfer
from the beneficiary. 3 6 For example, some commentators questioned the
128. Id.
129. Money Laundering Legislation, supra note 10, at 17 (statement of Clyde H. Farnsworth,
Jr., Director, Division of Federal Reserve Bank Operations, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System).
130. John F. Lee, President of the New York Clearing House Association, explained the
benefit of the restricted formats now in use by funds transfer systems, such as CHIPS: "Our
format requires payment information to be transmitted in a rigid sequence. Only by adherence
to such specifications can payments be computer processed quickly and accurately and thereby
meet the needs of the international commercial community." Drug Money Laundering Control
Efforts, supra note 31, at 73.
131. See JPMorgan Comment, supra note 28, at 4.
132. American Bankers Comment, supra note 25, at 8; see also Federal Reserve Comment,
supra note 15, at 31. Manual processing also is considered to increase the risks of human
error in execution of payment orders. U.C.C. § 4A-207 official comment 2.
133. See NYCH Comment, supra note 24, at 5, 9.
134. The Federal Reserve Board suggested that "ambiguous and confusing drafting of the
regulation [would] hinder bank efforts to familiarize themselves with its requirements," in
particular as they may "require extensive interpretation and subsequent revision of operating
procedures." Federal Reserve Comment, supra note 15, at 7.
135. See 136 CONG. REc. H41,701 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1990) (statement of Rep. Gonzales);
Chase Manhattan Comment, supra note 31, at 11; Comment Letter from the Securities Industry
Association to the Department of the Treasury 3 (Jan. 15, 1991) [hereinafter SIA Comment].
136. See American Express Comment, supra note 14, at 10; Federal Reserve Comment,
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scope of the phrase "publicly traded corporation"; they asked whether
corporations whose securities were traded over-the-counter were exempt or
whether only those corporations that were listed on an exchange were
exempt. 17 Others argued that the classes of transfers exempt from this
requirement ought to be expanded.13 8 In addition to concerns about specific
definitions or requirements, some funds transfer industry members were
concerned about the lack of industry-protective features and proposed the
inclusion of a "safe harbor" rule for good faith compliance with the
amended regulation. 39
C. Questionable Utility for Law Enforcement Purposes
Under the Bank Secrecy Act, the Treasury's authority to adopt regulations
extends to those requirements that have a "high degree of utility in tax,
criminal, and regulatory investigations and proceedings."'140 The Department
has not established that the proposed requirements would yield highly useful
information.
The sheer volume of funds transfers will undermine the proposal's utility
to law enforcement agencies. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System estimates that the proposal's enhanced recordkeeping requirements
would apply to "approximately 100 million transfers annually.' 4' The funds
transfer industry estimates that nearly all funds transfers relate to legitimate
business transactions.' 42 Assuming that its estimate is accurate, the funds
supra note 15, at 16; JPMorgan Comment, supra note 28, at 14-15; Comment Letter from
Bank of Oklahoma-Tulsa to the Department of the Treasury 1-3 (Jan. 8, 1991) [hereinafter
Bank of Oklahoma-Tulsa Comment].
137. NYCH Comment, supra note 24, at 20.
138. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 205 (1991); BAI Comment, supra note 31, at 8 (calling, inter
alia, for exemptions for transactions made by mutual funds or brokers on behalf of beneficial
owners of funds (presumably because their identities are known), transactions of bank acting
on behalf of non-banking subsidiary, and transactions by subsidiaries of regulated companies);
NYCH Comment, supra note 24, at 18 (urging exemptions for transfers in which originator
or beneficiary is a regulated entity and also for those transfers subject to Federal Reserve
Board Regulation E (Electronic Fund Transfers)). Others called for dollar thresholds as a
means of limiting the implementation burdens on banks. See American Bankers Comment,
supra note 25, at 15 (calling for a $10,000 floor for coverage); American Express Comment,
supra note 14, at 6-7 (calling for a $10,000 floor and a $10,000,000 ceiling); Citicorp Comment
II, supra note 70, at 10-11 (also urging a $10,000 floor for coverage).
139. A number of the comments expressed concern in light of the prospect that non-
compliance with Bank Secrecy Act regulations could result in severe penalties, including charter
termination.
140. 12 U.S.C. § 5311 (1988).
141. Federal Reserve Comment, supra note 15, at 6. The Board assumed that the Treasury
would exempt all inter-bank transfers from the proposed recordkeeping requirements. Id.
142. See NYCH Comment, supra note 24, at 3 (estimated that 99.75% of all transfers relate
to legitimate transactions); Merchants Nat'l Comment, supra note 31, at 2 (estimated that if
industry's estimate that .0002% of transfers are laundering-related is accurate then only 40 of
200,000 transfers Merchants National handles annually would be related to money laundering).
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transfer proposal would generate millions of records annually that relate
only to legitimate transactions and consequently would increase the burden
of identifying illegal transactions.' 43 In light of the regulatory burden likely
to be imposed if the proposal is adopted, one must ask whether the proposed
recordkeeping requirements will produce information that will prove highly
useful in policing money laundering. The new requirements are apparently
easily circumvented. Moreover, funds transfer industry members contend
that of the prosecutions that have actually occurred those most widely
touted by law enforcement agencies were not the result of tracing funds
transfer records but were the product of more traditional law enforcement
techniques, such as leads.'" Finally, members of the industry point out that
the nature of wire transfers makes them extremely difficult to examine for
potential laundering. 45
1. Percentage of Funds Transfers
Actually Involving Money Laundering
The funds transfer proposal addresses problems in only a very small
percentage of transfers conducted by domestic banks.'" Federal law enforce-
ment officials generally estimate that drug trafficking generates between
$100 and $150 billion in cash annually 47 and that "approximately 50-70%
of this figure is available for laundering and investment."'"1 To put these
figures in perspective, JPMorgan, a leading provider of U.S. dollar-
denominated payment and clearing services, explained that "in a single day
[it] processes a dollar volume of legitimate funds transfers greater than the
annual cash proceeds of illegal drug dealing in the United States.' 49 Another
industry member compared the task of finding a money-laundering transfer
to "searching for tainted dollars that mathematically represent a grain of
sand in the Sahara."' 50
143. Chase Manhattan Comment, supra note 31, at 3.
144. Citicorp Comment II, supra note 70, at 3. For a discussion of specific law enforcement
proceedings and the nature of the lead in each, see Money Laundering, supra note 83, at 160-
65 (statement of Cliff E. Cook, Vice President and Compliance Officer, Puget Sound National
Bank, speaking on behalf of the American Bankers Association).
145. Money Laundering, supra note 83, at 73 (statement of Cliff E. Cook, Vice President
and Compliance Officer, Puget Sound National Bank, speaking on behalf of the American
Bankers Association); see also Federal Reserve Comment, supra note 15, at 3-4 (distinguishing
funds transfers from large cash transactions and noting that patterns of transfer activity for
legitimate and illegitimate means appear similar).
146. For example, Citibank annually processes more than one million funds transfers,
representing "a value of one trillion, seven hundred thirty-eight billion dollars." Citicorp
Comment II, supra note 70, at 1.
147. JPMorgan Comment, supra note 28, at 3; see Money Laundering, supra note 83, at
90 (statement of Rep. Torres); Citicorp Comment II, supra note 70, at 3 (citation omitted).
148. See Citicorp Comment II, supra note 70, at 3; NYCH Comment, supra note 24, at 3.
149. JPMorgan Comment, supra note 28, at 3.
150. Citicorp Comment H, supra note 70, at 3.
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In addition, funds transfer industry members generally agree that whole
categories of funds transfers are not likely to be used in money laundering.15 '
Among these are transfers involving very small and very large dollar
amounts, 5 2 transfers on behalf of persons who are not customers of the
bank, 5 1 transfers by regulated companies and their subsidiaries, 54 and
transfers in which the beneficiary will receive the proceeds in cash. 55 Industry
experts also consider transfers transmitted directly by non-bank senders to
regional Federal Reserve Banks safe from money laundering because of the
review undertaken by the Bank before permitting non-banks direct access
to Fedwire.' 56 As a consequence of these factors, the funds transfer proposal
will affect millions of transfers that are not likely to involve money laun-
dering.1 7
151. The industry has offered support for its position that the vast majority of transfers
are legitimate commercial payments. See Drug Money Laundering Control Efforts, supra note
31, at 74 (statement of NYCH President John F. Lee, summarizing a 1988 study by the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which revealed that "approximately 42% of the dollar
amount of our [CHIPS] payments are foreign exchange trades, 33% are Eurodollar placements
[transactions in non-local currencies], and 25% are commercial, settlement and miscellaneous
transactions [bank loans and Federal funds]").
152. NYCH Comment, supra note 24, at 18-19 (arguing as to large dollar transfers that
drug industry is not highly concentrated, that it involves many small dealers and middlemen,
and that prominent traffickers spread proceeds around to minimize losses from seizures). The
comment argues for exemptions for transfers of less than $10,000 or greater than $10,000,000.
Id.
153. BAI Comment, supra note 31, at 4 (arguing that most banks do not execute wires for
non-customers, that banks that do will limit amounts transferred for non-customers, and that
for beneficiaries engaged in money laundering and drug trafficking the "last thing they want
is cash").
154. Id. at 8.
155. Id. at 4. The Institute observed that it is not clear why a beneficiary involved in drug
trafficking or money laundering would wish to have the proceeds of the transfer in cash on
the grounds that they already have huge amounts of surplus cash and that such beneficiaries
are more likely to want the proceeds deposited in an account (a transaction already subject to
Bank Secrecy Act recordkeeping or reporting requirements) or in a monetary instrument (also
subject to recordkeeping or reporting depending on amount of monetary instrument purchased).
See id. at 4, 11.
156. All senders that send payment orders directly to a regional Federal Reserve Bank for
Fedwire must have that Reserve Bank's agreement before they can commence sending. See 12
C.F.R. § 210.30(a), 55 Fed. Reg. 40,805 (1990) (adoption of Uniform Commercial Code Article
4A for Fedwire transfers).
157. The comments suggested additional categories of exemptions that would reduce the
burden of the funds transfer proposal. Principal among these were thresholds for recordkeeping
at $10,000 and $10,000,000. Inst. of Int'l Bankers Comment, supra note 124, at 8 (arguing
that a $10,000 threshold for recordkeeping requirements would provide relief for financial
institutions while not reducing law enforcement results); NYCH Comment, supra note 24, at
19 (suggesting that few money launderers would risk exposure of more than $10,000,000). The
Federal Reserve Board suggested that the planned exemption for bank-to-bank transactions
would take roughly 50% of transfers outside the scope of regulation. Federal Reserve Comment,
supra note 15, at 6.
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2. Circumventing Aspects of Funds Transfer
Certain provisions of the funds transfer proposal could be circumvented
easily. For example, although the proposal mandates that banks maintain
extensive records of transfers, users of funds transfer services are not
required to disclose complete and accurate information about the transfer,'
nor will they incur liability for providing inaccurate or incomplete responses
about the beneficial ownership of funds transferred or of funds received'59
or about the existence of separate payment instructions.' 60 Moreover, the
proposal requires only that banks inquire and record whatever response
they receive from their customers. There is no reason to believe that money
launderers would provide truthful information about persons on whose
behalf they are acting and whose identity they are attempting to conceal.' 6'
As a consequence of these and other factors, 62 it is unclear what utility
these provisions will offer.
In addition, money launderers need not use funds transfers at all. They
can evade the new funds transfer requirements by restructuring their trans-
actions and changing to payments by checks and drafts'63 or by shifting to
offshore settlements.'6
Assuming significant changes to funds transfer formats to communicate
more information about participants in funds transfers, one expert explained
that "[t]here is no assurance that wire transfers originating in foreign
countries will contain information sufficient to satisfy the [proposed] re-
cordkeeping requirements.' ' 65 To the extent that money launderers are able
to route their transactions through a series of transfers outside the United
158. E.g., American Bankers Comment, supra note 25, at 6; Chase Manhattan Comment,
supra note 31, at 3.
159. See 1990 Funds Transfer Proposal, supra note 8, at 41,703 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R.
§ 103.33(e)(1)(i)(E), (e)(1)(iii)(E)) (referred to elsewhere as "on-whose-behalf" information).
160. See id.
161. Federal Reserve Comment, supra note 15, at 11.
162. For example, the New York Clearing House questioned the utility of the "on-whose-
behalf" provisions on the ground that the data recorded will not be reported to the federal
government. NYCH Comment, supra note 24, at 13. The comment concluded that investigative
leads would "continue to come to the government as they do today: from informants,
undercover operations, and other traditional police techniques." Id.
163. Money Laundering Legislation, supra note 10, at 71 (statement of Clyde H. Farnsworth,
Jr., Director, Division of Federal Reserve Bank Operations, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System).
164. Drug Money Laundering Control Efforts, supra note 31, at 9 (statement of Sen.
D'Amato) (suggesting that the Bank of Japan is preparing its own funds transfer system for
offshore clearing).
165. Money Laundering Legislation, supra note 10, at 16 (statement of Clyde H. Farnsworth,
Jr., Director, Division of Federal Reserve Bank Operations, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System); see BAI Comment, supra note 31, at 3 (arguing that transfers originating
abroad often will lack some of the data required by the proposal).
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States or through countries with strict bank secrecy laws to obscure own-
ership of the funds,'"6 enhanced recordkeeping requirements for funds
transfers involving domestic banks will not reduce the potential for circum-
vention of the detection system. 167
3. Retrievability of Information Imposes Significant Costs
Retrievability of information appears to be the paramount goal of the
funds transfer proposal. The proposal would require that originators' banks
have the capacity to retrieve records of funds transfers by the name of the
originator of the transfer and the originator's account number, if applica-
ble.16 It would impose a similar duty on beneficiaries' banks in reference
to the beneficiary's name and account number. 69 These requirements would
necessitate considerable reorganization of the method in which the funds
transfer industry in general, and banks in particular, store information
about transactions.
Some industry members have questioned their capacity to retrieve infor-
mation by the name of the originator or beneficiary, as opposed to retrieval
by account number. Retrieval by name presents unique problems for banks.
One commentator observed:
Since-soma names are quite common, it becomes difficult for banks to
comply with a request by name alone.
. hen law enforcement requests transfers under these provisions,
the bank will initiate the search by verifying whether or not the individual
is a customer. Assuming they are, most banks will be able to check the
DDA (demand deposit account) activity listing for wire transactions.
This list will direct the bank to the date and perhaps identifying number
of all transactions. The materials will then be manually copied from
daily files. 70
Another commentator noted that retrieval by the name of the sender or
beneficiary "would not seem to be needed for the government to trace
proceeds of illegal activities. All that is necessary for such tracing is to be
able to identify the account into which illegal profits have been deposited
and follow the money's trail from there." 17' Still another commentator
166. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
167. Money launderers are unlikely to be deterred by the small additional expense and
modest delays associated with additional layers of international funds transfers.
168. 1990 Funds Transfer Proposal, supra note 8, at 41,703.
169. Id.
170. BAI Comment, supra note 31, at 11 (discussing proposed 31 C.F.R. § 103.33(e)).
171. NYCH Comment, supra note 24, at 13 (discussing the requirements for on-behalf-of
information).
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suggested that retrieval by name would not be sufficient for tracing funds
transfers. 72
4. General Utility Not Demonstrated
The funds transfer proposal also raises serious issues of general utility in
light of the ease with which money launderers can find other avenues to
wash their proceeds, the cumbersome process of obtaining records under
existing Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, 73 and other barriers to obtaining
bank records from countries with strict bank secrecy laws. 17 4
Money launderers can select funds transfer methods that generate less
information than others. 75 Additionally, money launderers are adept at
locating the medium least likely to attract attention. 76 In a very brief period
in the mid-1980s, they switched from cash deposits to cash purchases of
monetary instruments, to smaller, "smurfed" cash deposits and purchases
of instruments, to funds transfers, and, more recently, to funds transmit-
tals.'"
Industry experts have suggested the possibility that the funds transfer
proposal could have the effect of driving transactions-legitimate as well as
money laundering-to offshore netting. One industry expert explained,
overly burdensome [reporting] requirements could drive transactions tied
to money laundering into offshore clearing systems where they would
be even more difficult to detect. These burdensome requirements could
also drive legitimate transactions offshore as well. Networks have already
been established in several foreign countries to facilitate the transfer of
dollar-denominated payment.' 78
172. Comment Letter from The Swiss Bankers Association to the Department of the Treasury
3 (Nov. 21, 1990) [hereinafter Swiss Bankers Comment] (arguing that without transaction dates
there is little chance of finding useful information and that intermediary banks are unable to
retrieve funds transfer data by the names of the originator or beneficiary, or by account
numbers alone, even when these records are maintained).
173. For a thorough discussion of the status of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties and of
the processes necessary to obtain information, see Knapp, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
as a Way to Pierce Bank Secrecy, 20 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 405 (1988); Zagaris,
Developments in International Judicial Assistance and Related Matters, 18 DEN. J. INT'L L.
& PO'y 339, 351-58 (1990).
174. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
175. For example, they may send key payment instructions separately as do some European
banks. Republic Bank Comment, supra note 46, at 3.
176. See I. WALTER, THE SEcar MoNEY MN nRK 157-71 (1990).
177. Cf. Money Laundering Legislation, supra note 10, at 159 (statement of Rep. Saxton
on funds transmittals and H.R. 4044, observing that money launderers "run from the light
focused on the banks").
178. Money Laundering Legislation, supra note 10, at 72 (statement of Clyde H. Farnsworth,
Jr., Director, Division of Federal Reserve Bank Operations, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System); see JPMorgan Comment, supra note 28, at 4 (citing Federal Reserve Board
Interim Policy Statement on Offshore Netting and Clearing Arrangements, 54 Fed. Reg. 26,092
(June 21, 1989)); NYCH Comment, supra note 24, at 6. Offshore branches of U.S. banks are
not required to report cash transactions. 134 CONG. REc. S15,993 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988)
(statement of Sen. Kerry).
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Some evidence suggests that banking transactions move to the least-regulated
and least-taxed jurisdictions. 179 Funds transfer industry members and experts
worry that further increases in the flow of funds to offshore branches of
U.S. banks would cost the U.S. banking industry substantial income and
exchange business.8 0 The Federal Reserve Board's staff also projected that
the funds transfer proposal "could have adverse consequences for the
competitive position of U.S. financial institutions and at the margin, for
the attractiveness of the dollar as a vehicle for international payments."''
Other weaknesses in the proposal stem from misconceptions about the
value of the proposed funds transfer records. The Treasury and federal law
enforcement officials appear to assume that records of wire transfers would
be as valuable as currency transaction reports.' m Funds transfer industry
experts, however, question this assumption primarily because funds transfers
are far less likely to involve face-to-face encounters between the bank and
the customer than are currency transactions.' They also observe that even
if funds transfer records would prove as useful as currency transaction
reports, the former nevertheless will be far more numerous than the latter."4
179. Terrel & Mills, International Banking Facilities and the Eurodollar Market, in EuRo-
DOLLARS AND INTERNATIONAL BANING 183, 199 (P. Savona & G. Sutija eds. 1985). The authors
explain that international banking facilities and Eurodollar transactions are important sources
of revenue for U.S. banks because they can pay higher rates of interest due to their freedom
from reserve requirements and deposit insurance premiums. They also describe a dramatic rise
generally in the business of U.S. banks in offshore banking centers and especially in the
deposits in the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands. Id. at 183; see also I. WALTER, supra note
176, at 160 (Figure 6.1-U.S. bank liabilities to Latin America and the Caribbean, 1970, 1975,
1980-85) (revealing especially large increases in bank liabilities to the Cayman Islands and the
Bahamas).
180. See Money Laundering in Florida, supra note 2, at Ill (statement of Peter R. Fowler,
Vice President, Barclays Bank, PLC, Miami); Chase Manhattan Comment, supra note 31, at
2.
181. Money Laundering Legislation, supra note 10, at 17 (statement of Clyde H. Farnsworth,
Jr., Director, Division of Federal Reserve Bank Operations, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System); see NYCH Comment, supra note 24, at 5.
182. See Money Laundering Legislation, supra note 10, at 69-70 (statement of Clyde H.
Farnsworth, Jr., Director, Division of Federal Reserve Bank Operations, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System); Money Laundering in Florida, supra note 2, at 62-63, 68-69
(statements of Rep. Shaw, Merlin Heye, District Director, I.R.S. Ft. Lauderdale District, Sen.
Graham, and Charles Saphos, Chief, Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Section, Criminal
Division, U.S. Deptartment of Justice); Federal Reserve Comment, supra note 15, at 3-5.
183. E.g., Bank of Oklahoma-Tulsa Comment, supra note 136, at 13; NYCH Comment,
supra note 24, at 13.
184. Under the funds transfer proposal, assuming the current volumes of funds transfers,
the industry would be required to make records of roughly 100 million transfers. See Federal
Reserve Comment, supra note 15, at 6, 9. By contrast, banks and other businesses file about
7 million currency transaction reports annually. MoNEY LAuNDERING TASK FORCE, supra note
1, at S5556. Industry experts anticipate that funds transfers will become far more numerous,
as corporate dividend and interest payments, municipal bond interest payments, and bond
redemptions become payable in federal funds in 1992. SIA Comment, supra note 135, at 3.
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Additionally, they point out that law enforcement agencies have underutil-
ized currency transaction reports because of their large volume and the
agencies' staffing problems.185 For this reason, funds transfer industry
members express concern that if the proposal were to be adopted it would
generate records that law enforcement agencies will not be capable of
processing.8 6
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System also questioned
the utility of the additional records required by the proposal. The Board's
comment letter explained that:
the pattern of funds transfers for much legitimate activity is likely to
be similar to the pattern of funds transfers for illegitimate activity. For
example, a legitimate business managing its cash position carefully is
likely to draw down its deposits promptly and concentrate the funds in
a few locations for investment or disbursement purposes. Many legitimate
businesses will have legitimate reasons for regularly transferring funds
overseas, to make either payments or investments. Foreign transfers may
be particularly frequent and commonplace for those businesses investing
in the Eurodollar markets or in foreign currencies. Similarly, a money
launderer is likely to remove the proceeds of deposits from accounts
quickly, concentrate them at one or more concentration points and
thereafter transfer the funds overseas where they can be concealed more
readily and where they may be more difficult for United States law
enforcement agencies to reach. 187
5. Information Already Recorded
The funds transfer industry at this point already records and retains the
data that would be required by the proposed regulation, 8 8 with the exception
of those types of information not communicated in standard funds transfer
formats." 9 The industry' 90 as well as the Federal Reserve Board' 9' apparently
185. See Money Laundering Legislation, supra note 10, at 55 (the Internal Revenue Service's
Detroit Center reviews incoming currency transaction reports (CTR) within 33 days of receipt);
Money Laundering in Florida, supra note 2, at 76 (statement of Gerald Lewis, Florida
Comptroller); Drug Money Laundering Control Efforts, supra note 31, at 35 (statement of
Timothy D. Mahoney, Director of Special Investigations Division, New York State Dept. of
Banks).
186. See Citicorp Comment I, supra note 86, at 2; Inst. Int'l Bankers Comment, supra note
124, at 10.
187. Federal Reserve Comment, supra note 15, at 3-4; see also Drug Money Laundering
Control Efforts, supra note 31, at 74 (statement of John H. Lee, President, New York Clearing
House Association) (describing appearance of CHIPS transfers as consolidations).
188. BAI Comment, supra note 31, at 2 (citing existing Bank Secrecy Act requirements
affecting the industry's existing recordation and retention policies); Money Laundering in
Florida, supra note 2, at 129 (statement of Peter R. Fowler, Vice President, Barclays Bank,
PLC, Miami).
189. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text; see American Bankers Comment, supra
note 25, at 1, 8, 16; Chase Manhattan Comment, supra note 31, at 4.
190. E.g., JPMorgan Comment, supra note 28, at 2; NYCH Comment, supra note 24, at
4.
191. Federal Reserve Comment, supra note 15, at 5.
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considers the existing information-whether required by current Bank Se-
crecy Act regulations or by banks' internal procedures-sufficient for pur-
poses of creating trails of funds transfers. A number of commentators
suggest that making an effort to bring all members of the industry into
compliance with existing regulations would be more productive than impos-
ing new requirements on the industry as a whole.'1 Commentators instead
suggest that law enforcement personnel could use existing records at a far
smaller cost than the costs anticipated in connection with the proposal.' 93
III. ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF INFORMATION
-USEFUL TO LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
Assuming that the Treasury's goals in the funds transfer proposal are
uniformity of information and ease of retrievability, the question arises
whether another mechanism exists for satisfying those goals that would not
impose as large a regulatory burden on the funds transfer industry. This
Article asserts that information comparable to that sought by the funds
transfer proposal is or soon will be generated as the funds transfer industry
in the United States adapts itself to the requirements of Uniform Commercial
Code Article 4A, 19 to the substantial adoption of Article 4A for Fedwire
transactions that became effective on January 1, 1991,19s and to the expan-
sion of the CHIPS message format anticipated by mid-1992.196 In addition,
this Article argues for increased enforcement of existing bank secrecy
requirements in lieu of new regulations. Finally, it calls for greater reliance
on banks' knowledge of their customer bases to identify suspect transfers.97
A. Information Likely to Flow from Article 4A
Prior to the adoption of Article 4A, no comprehensive body of law
existed for funds transfers. 98 Rather, rules of the principal funds transfer
192. E.g., BAI Comment, supra note 31, at 2.
193. E.g., Federal Reserve Comment, supra note 15, at 5.
194. U.C.C. Article 4A (1991). Twenty-eight states, including New York, have adopted
Article 4A. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. Because New York law governs CHIPS
transactions, New York's adoption significantly increases the number of funds transfers subject
to Article 4A.
195. 12 C.F.R. § 210 (1991).
196. NYCH Comment, supra note 24, at 16.
197. Many U.S. and foreign banks have adopted procedures, known in banking circles as
"know your customer" standards, to identify patterns of suspicious activity. In December
1988, the Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices (Basle Committee)
endorsed "know your customer" standards as one of the best means of curtailing money
laundering through banks. OCC Banking Circular 227, supra note 100, at 11,635; see Swiss
Bankers Comment, supra note 172, at 2. For an explanation of the functions of the Basle
Committee, see infra note 245.
198. U.C.C. Article 4A Prefatory Note; see also Ballen & Diana, The Need for Article 4A,
45 Bus. LAW. 1399 (1990).
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systems (such as CHIPS and Fedwire) governed transfers made through
those systems,199 while operating rules of regional clearing house associations,
Federal Reserve System rules, and operating circulars applied to transfers
made outside of Fedwire and CHIPS." ° Contracts between banks and their
customers covered other, but not all, aspects of funds transfers. 20 1 The chief
goals of the authors of Article 4A were to provide a comprehensive body
of law for funds transfers and, in particular, to remove "uncertainty"
about the "juridical nature of a wire transfer and consequently of the rights
and obligations that are created." 2
Article 4A establishes the first industry-wide set of rules for resolving
critical disputes that may arise in funds transfers. For example, Article 4A,
inter alia, addresses (1) the responsibility for unauthorized, erroneous, or
erroneously executed funds transfers;2 3 (2) the risk of loss associated with
the insolvency of a bank handling a funds transfer; (3) the responsibility to
pay for and the right to receive payment for funds transfers; and (4) the
effect of payment by funds transfer on any contractual obligation between
an originator and a beneficiary. In so doing, Article 4A also provides for
common understanding of concepts such as "acceptance" (the point at
which the beneficiary's bank becomes obligated to the beneficiary to pay
the amount of the payment order),2 for resolving bank errors in funds
transfers, and for allocating losses for unauthorized payment orders. These
199. See U.C.C. § 4A-501 official comment 1:
Funds-transfer system rules ... cover a wide variety of matters such as form
and content of payment orders, security procedures, cancellation rights and
procedures, indemnity rights, compensation rules for delays in completion of a
funds transfer, time and method of settlement, credit restrictions with respect to
senders of payment orders and risk allocation with respect to suspension of
payments by a participating bank.
Id.
200. Id. Section 4A-107 expressly provides that "[riegulations of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System and operating circulars of the Federal Reserve Banks supersede
any inconsistent provision of this Article to the extent of the inconsistency." U.C.C. § 4A-
107.
201. U.C.C. Article 4A Prefatory Note ("Why is Article 4A Needed?"); see Ballen & Diana,
supra note 198, at 1399 ("[T]here often are no agreements between the parties to a wholesale
wire transfer, or such agreements do not address all of the necessary issues."); Scott, supra
note 29, at 1668.
202. U.C.C. Article 4A Prefatory Note.
203. These issues are addressed by a number of provisions of Article 4A. E.g., U.C.C. §§
4A-202 ("Authorized and Verified Payment Orders"), 4A-203 ("Unenforceability of Certain
Verified Payment Orders"), 4A-207 ("Misdescription of Beneficiary"), 4A-302 ("Obligations
of Receiving Bank in Execution of Payment Order"), 4A-303 ("Erroneous Execution of
Payment Order"), and 4A-305 ("Liability for Late or Improper Execution or Failure to
Execute Payment Order"). In addition, section 4A-304 imposes a duty on the sender to report
erroneously executed payment orders. Section 4A-204 imposes a similar duty on the sender in
the event of unauthorized payment orders. As a consequence of these provisions, parties to-a
funds transfer subject to Article 4A have substantial incentives for maintaining precise records
relating to the payment orders sent and received.
204. U.C.C. § 4A-209.
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comprehensive laws facilitate standardized resolution of disputes involving
portions of the funds transfer handled by different funds transfer systems.209
As a consequence, Article 4A offers to the funds transfer industry a number
of incentives for better recordkeeping, in particular, in the forms of more
frequent or expanded written agreements between banks and their customers
and of records demonstrating that the bank has complied with any security
procedure that the bank and customer may have established. Each of these
characteristics of Article 4A touches on a key concern in the Treasury's
proposal.
Article 4A is likely to increase the number of written agreements between
banks and their customers or to expand the scope of existing written
agreements. In the customary funds transfer, the "originator" 206 of the
payment order is known to the "receiving bank" 2 because the bank acts
for an account holder.m As previously described, originators fall into three
categories. The first category includes those who use the wire service
infrequently or who have had no prior wire transactions and from whom
the bank has a written payment order or a record of a payment order
transmitted by telephone. The common point in these transactions is the
requirement that the bank assure itself that it is acting for the account
holder as the owner of the funds. 9 Customers in the second category of
originators frequently use funds transfers in their business. Banks may have
standing orders from them that may or may not be reduced to contracts,
210
together with corporate resolutions listing employees authorized to send
payment orders21 ' and separate lists of creditors that the customers expect
205. It is possible for a domestic funds transfer to involve more than one of the major
funds transfer systems. For example, in a transfer in which some of the banks are not
participants in Fedwire, the sender may communicate with its bank (the receiving bank) by
means of a local clearing house (a funds transfer system). The receiving bank (now designated
the originator's bank) in turn communicates with an intermediary bank by means of Fedwire
(itself a funds transfer system); and the intermediary bank communicates with the beneficiary's
bank by means of another local clearing house.
206. U.C.C. § 4A-104(d). Section 4A-103(a)(5) defines "sender" as "the person giving the
instruction to the receiving bank." There is only one "originator" in a funds transfer, but
there may be a number of "senders" as the transfer moves through the series of separate
payment orders necessary to effect the original instruction.
207. U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(4) defines "receiving bank" as "the bank to which the sender's
instruction is addressed."
208. This account relationship caused a number of comments on the funds transfer proposal
to question the necessity of obtaining "on-whose-behalf" information from the majority of
the senders of funds transfers. E.g., American Bankers Comment, supra note 25, at 9; BAI
Comment, supra note 31, at 7; cf. Republic Bank Comment, supra note 46, at I (questioning
the feasibility of the requirements for "on-whose-behalf" information).
209. See BAI Comment, supra note 31, at 7.
210. U.C.C. § 4A-203 official comment 3.
211. BAI Comment, supra note 31, at 7. The Institute observed that "[a]lthough the person
conducting the transaction may not be the beneficial owner of the account, a list of all
authorized individuals is already a matter of bank recordkeeping." Id.
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to pay by funds transfers. 2 2 In these cases, the customer may deliver a
magnetic tape containing numerous payment orders that the bank may
retain as support for the transfers. Customers in the third category of
originators make heavy use of wire transfers and consequently have auto-
mated access to the funds transfer functions within the bank.213 Banks
thoroughly scrutinize the customers who are allowed automated access. 214
It is in the area of electronic transmission of payment orders that Article
4A supplies rules that could achieve many of the benefits expected from
the funds transfer proposal. For customers who are eligible to transmit their
payment orders electronically, banks' "normal practice is to establish se-
curity procedures that usually involve the use of codes or identifying numbers
or words. " 213 Article 4A encourages banks to establish security procedures
by binding the customer to pay payment orders that "purport[] to be that
of its customer after verifying its authenticity by complying with a security
procedure agreed to by the customer and the bank" even if the orders were
not authorized. 2 6 In addition, should the bank accept an unauthorized
payment order without verifying it in compliance with the security procedure,
any loss would fall on the bank. 2 7 Security procedures under Article 4A
must be established by agreement between a customer and a receiving
bank.2 18 The procedure may be for the purpose of "(i) verifying that a
payment order or communication amending or cancelling a payment order
is that of the customer, or (ii) detecting error in the transmission or the
content of the payment order or communication. '219 The procedure may
consist of "the use of algorithms or other codes, identifying words or
numbers, encryption, callback procedures, or similar security devices."' 20
212. U.C.C. § 4A-203 official comment 3; see BAI Comment, supra note 31, at 7.
213. BAI Comment, supra note 31, at 7.
214. Id. The Institute explained that banks conduct reviews of prospective automated-access
customers that are "no less thorough than the review performed on customers who are placed
on the [currency transaction report] exemption list." Id. (suggesting that there is less need to
expend additional effort to identify the person "on-whose-behalf" the transfer is being made
in this category of transfers than there would be for persons who rarely use funds transfer
services or for persons who are not regular customers of the bank making the transfer).
215. U.C.C. Article 4A Prefatory Note ("Unauthorized Payment Orders").
216. Id. (describing U.C.C. § 4A-203). The Prefatory Note explains that the bank must
establish that the security procedure was
a commercially reasonable method of providing security against unauthorized
payment orders. The customer can also avoid liability if it can prove that the
unauthorized order was not initiated by an employee or other agent of the
customer having access to confidential security information or by a person who
obtained that information from a source controlled by the customer.
Id.
217. Id.
218. U.C.C. § 4A-201.
219. Id.
220. Id. The section also provides that "[c]omparison of a signature on a payment order
or communication with an authorized specimen signature of the customer is not by itself a
security procedure." Id.
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The term "security procedure" "does not apply to procedures that the
receiving bank may follow unilaterally in processing payment orders."2' 1
Ordinarily, each payment order is transmitted electronically and individ-
ually. The receiving bank will apply a testing procedure to each payment
order. Customers that make multiple funds transfers may deliver them to
their banks through an automated clearing house. In these cases, the
customer delivers an electronic device, such as a magnetic tape, which carries
many payment orders. The automated clearing house in turn delivers the
tape or other device to the bank. Although each instruction qualifies as an
individual payment order,m it is not considered feasible to test each of the
individual payment orders contained on the tape.m
Under Article 4A, payment orders are effective against the customer if
the receiving bank can prove (1) that it and its customer agreed that the
bank would verify payment orders in accordance with a security procedure,
(2) that the security procedure is a commercially reasonable method22 of
proving security against unauthorized payment orders, and (3) that it ac-
cepted the payment order "in good faith and in compliance with the security
procedure and any written agreement or instruction of the customer restrict-
ing acceptance of payment orders issued in the name of the customer."M
As a consequence of these steps required to bind the customer, receiving
banks have substantial incentives to (1) enter into written agreements estab-
lishing security procedures with their funds transfer customers, (2) maintain
records that reflect their application of the agreed security procedure prior
to executing the payment order in issue,2 and (3) maintain records dem-
onstrating that the customer selected the security procedure, and showing,
where applicable, that the customer "expressly agreed in writing" to be
221. U.C.C. § 4A-201 official comment.
222. U.C.C. § 4A-103(b).
223. U.C.C. § 4A-203 official comment 4.
224. To determine whether the security procedure is "commercially reasonable," section
4A-202(c) looks to:
the wishes of the customer expressed to the bank, the circumstances of the
customer known to the bank, including the size, type, and frequency of payment
orders normally issued by the customer to the bank, alternative security procedures
offered to the customer, and security procedures in general use by customers and
receiving banks similarly situated.
Id. Security procedures are deemed to be commercially reasonable if:
(i) the security procedure was chosen by the customer .after the bank offered,
and the customer refused, a security procedure that was commercially reasonable
for that customer, and (ii) the customer expressly agreed in writing to be bound
by any payment order, whether or not authorized, issued in its name and accepted
by the bank in compliance with the security procedure chosen by the customer.
Id. (emphasis added).
225. U.C.C. § 4A-202(b) ("Authorized and Verified Payment Orders").
226. The necessity of proving use of the security procedure-a function the industry calls
"testing"-should cause receiving banks that were not retaining any response to the test from
the sender to begin retaining them.
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bound. 227 In addition, the Official Comment to section 4A-203 explains,
"Given the large amount of the typical payment order, a prudent receiving
bank will be unwilling to accept a payment order unless it has assurance
that the order is what it purports to be. This assurance is normally provided
by security procedures described in Section 4A-201."
Security procedures also play an important role in resolving errors in the
transmission of payment orders. Under Article 4A, if the bank agrees to a
security procedure for the detection of error and fails to comply with the
procedure, the bank bears "any resulting loss. ' 229 Section 4A-205 describes
situations involving erroneous payment orders in which the sender is not
obligated to the bank.230 In each case, the sender's obligation turns on
whether the receiving bank can prove its compliance with the security
procedure established by the customer and the receiving bank. In addition,
section 4A-205(b) places the loss on the sender only in cases in which the
bank can prove the sender received notice of the bank's acceptance of the
payment order231 and failed to discover the error and to report it "within
a reasonable time, not exceeding 90 days. ' 2 2 Section 4A-501 permits banks
and their customers to vary by agreement the bank's liability for failing to
detect an error.23
Security procedures, whether designed to detect unauthorized payment
orders or to detect erroneous payment orders, may facilitate identifying
those funds transfers that fall outside the sender's transfer pattern. For
example, security procedures may reveal sudden increases in the amounts
transferred, in funds transfers to banks in so-called tax-haven countries, or
in funds transfers to new beneficiaries or beneficiaries outside the United
States.2 In addition, some security procedures are designed to "detect an
account number that is not one to which [the] [s]ender normally makes
payment. In that case, the security procedure may require a special verifi-
227. U.C.C. § 4A-202(c).
228. U.C.C. § 4A-203 official comment 1.
229. U.C.C. Article 4A Prefatory Note ("Unauthorized Payment Orders"). Banks are not
obligated to agree to special security procedures to detect errors in transmission. Id.
230. U.C.C. § 4A-205.
231. "Acceptance" by the receiving bank carries a duty to "execute" (that is, to transmit
the payment order to the next bank in sequence and to pay if the beneficiary's bank in turn
accepts the payment order). U.C.C. § 4A-209(a) & official comment 1; see also U.C.C. § 4A-
302(a)-(c) ("Obligations of Receiving Bank in Execution of Payment Order").
232. U.C.C. § 4A-205(b). In these cases, the sender's liability is limited to the loss that the
bank proves it suffered as a result of the sender's failure to report the error. Id.
233. U.C.C. § 4A-501 ("Variation by Agreement and Effect of Funds-Transfer System
Rule").
234. A list of authorized beneficiaries alone would be useful in establishing the trail of
laundered monies because it facilitates understanding of the regular business habits of the
bank's customer and also identifies transfers (whether in amount or beneficiary) that fall
outside previously established patterns. See Federal Reserve Comment, supra note 15, at 5.
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cation that payment to the stated account number was intended."' 23 Other
potential uses exist for security procedures that would assist in identifying
suspicious transactions from funds transfer records likely to be retained by
receiving banks. For example, a customer may
prohibit the bank from accepting a payment order that is not payable
from an authorized account, that exceeds the credit balance in specified
accounts of the customer, or that exceeds some other amount.... Such
limitations may be incorporated into the security procedure itself or they
may be covered by a separate agreement or instruction. 236
To the extent that such restrictions form the agreements between the sender
and receiving bank, Article 4A may encourage their reduction to written
contracts that can be used to assist law enforcement officials in tracing
drug proceeds.
Among the other incentives for enhanced recordkeeping are Article 4A's
rules imposing interest for delayed transfers. For example, section 4A-210(b)
imposes interest on a receiving bank, other than a beneficiary's bank, that
fails to execute a payment order despite the availability of funds in the
sender's account sufficient to cover the transfer. 237 If the sender does not
receive notice of the rejection of the payment order and if the account that
was to be debited does not bear interest, the receiving bank is obligated to
the sender for interest on the amount of the order. 238 Pursuant to this
provision, the receiving bank will maintain records of the execution date
and the date it gave any notice of rejection to the sender. Additionally,
because the only remedy available to a receiving bank that executes an
unauthorized payment order is to recover from the person who received
payment, 239 it is likely that receiving banks will retain all information about
the named beneficiary from the payment orders they execute.
Because of the size of many wholesale wire transfers, Article 4A encour-
ages banks and their customers to negotiate the level of security procedure
desired by the customer, assuming that it is consistent with the capacity of
the bank. Customers who send many payment orders or whose orders are
for larger sums may ask for more secure communications and more extensive
testing of their payment orders than they otherwise would require.
B. Fedwire's Adoption of Article 4A
The Federal Reserve System recently amended Regulation J to incorporate
Article 4A for funds transfers through Fedwire. 241 This amendment
235. U.C.C. § 4A-205 official comment 1.
236. U.C.C. § 4A-203 official comment 3.
237. U.C.C. § 4A-210(b).
238. Section 4A-210(b) establishes the formula for interest to be paid to the sender under
this circumstance.
239. U.C.C. § 4A-203 official comment 1.
240. See U.C.C. § 4A-203 official comment 3.
241. 12 C.F.R. § 210 (1991).
1992]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
significantly expands the number of transfers for which the market will
demand enhanced recordkeeping because Regulation J applies to transactions
involving Federal Reserve Bafiks in states that have not yet adopted Article
4A.2 2 Any new contracts and transaction records resulting from the incor-
poration of Article 4A into Regulation J will augment the Federal Reserve
System's existing capacity to provide detailed information on currency flows
and funds transfers to law enforcement agencies.23 Accordingly, the amount
of information potentially available to law enforcement agencies currently
is significantly greater than it was when the funds transfer proposal first
was announced two years ago.
C. Expanded Message Format for CHIPS Transfers
Assuming that CHIPS completes the revision of its message format by
mid-1992, information about CHIPS funds transfers will increase. To the
extent that the funds transfer proposal would require information in addition
to that provided for in the CHIPS revision, the format would have to be
changed again,2" as would computer capacity, training, and storage. This,
242. Id.
243. The Federal Reserve System has the capacity to make detailed reports on the movements
of cash within Federal Reserve Board regions and from the United States to foreign countries.
For example, the Federal Reserve System can reveal foreign countries with surpluses in United
States dollars. This data has been used in the past by federal law enforcement officials to
focus their investigations of drug and arms trafficking. See 136 CONG. REc. H1706, H1706
(daily ed. Apr. 25, 1990) (statement of Rep. Levine). In addition, the Federal Reserve System
can identify local banks that may be violating currency transaction reporting requirements by
comparing the numbers of bills of certain values in the bank's possession against the amounts
known to be in circulation in that Federal Reserve district. Information of this type has led
federal and state investigators to Texas and Florida banks involved in money laundering. H.
REP. No. 446, supra note 13, at 19. A Federal Reserve Board official testified before Congress
that the Board's computers were capable of generating data on the movement of currency "at
any level of detail" necessary for law enforcement purposes and that the Board makes currency
surplus data reports available to federal enforcement agencies. Money Laundering Legislation,
supra note 10, at 73 (statement of Clyde H. Farnsworth, Jr., Director, Division of Federal
Reserve Bank Operations, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
In addition to information about currency movements, the Federal Reserve System employs
"type codes" to distinguish between "on-line" and "offline" beneficiaries' banks participating
in Fedwire funds transfers. 12 C.F.R. § 210.29 (1991) (commentary in Appendix A). At this
time, however, it cannot distinguish between transactions in which the offline bank is the
beneficiary of the payment order and those in which it is the beneficiary's bank for another
bank. Id. It also can distinguish between "customer transfers" and bank transfers. Drug
Money Laundering Control Efforts, supra note 31, at 124 (statement of Joseph B. H. Madison,
Joseph Madison Associates, Inc., Lanesborough, Mass.).
244. The current format changes have taken more than two years to complete. See Drug
Money Laundering Control Efforts, supra note 31, at 75 (statement of John F. Lee, President
of New York Clearing House Association) (discussing attempts at alterations in the CHIPS
format to allow for more information and describing the status of the work as of November
1989).
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accordingly, would raise significantly the burdens of meeting the proposal's
requirements.
D. Increased Enforcement of Existing Bank Secrecy Act
Requirements for Funds Transfers
In addition to the data relating to funds transfers that are likely to be
generated by Article 4A, Fedwire, and CHIPS, the greatest source of
information about money laundering through funds transfers is in existing
records of funds transfers. Many commentators on the funds transfer
proposal called for increased enforcement of existing bank secrecy require-
ments in lieu of additional regulations.4 5
Commentators also advocated increased reliance on banks' knowledge of
their customers and their banking habits. National banks, for example, are
required to set up internal procedures through which they can scrutinize
transactions and report suspicious activity to law enforcement agencies.M
These internal procedures are known in the banking industry as "know
your customer" standards.
Banking experts have focused on the "know your customer" standards
as a key means of identifying illegal transactions such as money laundering.
In December, 1988, the Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and
Supervisory Practices promulgated a "Statement of Principles" on the
"Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking System for the Purpose of
Money-Laundering. ' 247 The statement also called for wider use of "know
your customer" standards and for specific additions to those standards. 2
Members of the United States banking and funds transfer industries have
called upon the Treasury, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
and the Federal Reserve Board to promulgate more detailed "know your
customer" standards to aid U.S. banks and other financial institutions in
245. E.g., Chase Manhattan Comment, supra note 31, at 3. For a discussion of existing
requirements, see supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text.
246. Money Laundering Through Wire Transfers, Advisory Letter 88-5, 1 Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) 11,781 (Oct. 26, 1988); see 12 C.F.R. § 21.11 (1991); OCC Banking Circular
227, supra note 100, at 11,635.
247. The "Statement of Principles" is modeled after an agreement between the Swiss
National Bank and the Swiss Bankers Association originally concluded in 1977 and amended
in 1987. Swiss Bankers Comment, supra note 172, at 3. The Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency circulated the Statement of Principles to all national banks. Statement of Principles,
OCC Banking Circular 231, 1 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 11,785 (Jan. 9, 1989). The
FDIC circulated the Statement to all FDIC banks and savings and loan associations. Statement
of Principles on Money Laundering Practices, FDIC BL-1-89, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 87,562 (Jan. 27, 1989).
248. Statement of Principles, OCC Banking Circular 231, supra note 247, at 11,785.
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identifying money-laundering transactions. 249 In connection with the funds
transfer proposal, one industry expert explained why the "know your
customer" approach was preferable to more recordkeeping:
Money laundering deterrence that probes beyond cash entering the
financial system, what we call secondary laundering, is harder to control
by reporting or recordkeeping. In fact, secondary laundering is probably
only detectable through a comprehensive "know your customer" pro-
gram, where the bank understands both a customer's source of cash
and their normal business activity for the disposition of funds. Other
than through information derived from adequate "know your customer"
procedures, banks find that there is nothing inherently suspicious about
a check, a wire transfer or an [automated clearing house] transaction
drawn on collected funds. It appears, therefore, that the quick and easy
traceability of criminal proceeds is the primary law enforcement objective
of this proposed regulation. We imagine that law enforcement would
also prefer that regulations governing the wire transfer function make
money launderers less likely to use the wire system, and that if the
system is used, that transfers of criminal proceeds are more likely to be
detected. Without addressing "know your customer" standards, these
proposed regulations do not address these goalsY
To the extent that the Treasury and the federal bank regulatory agencies
can develop profiles of transfers that are inherently suspect, they can enhance
significantly the value of whatever records that banks ultimately will be
required to keep by narrowing the number of accounts or records of account
activity for evaluation.2'
IV. RECOMIENDATIONS
The Treasury's funds transfer proposal reflects a number of flaws inherent
in its exercise of its regulatory authority under the Bank Secrecy Act.
249. See BAI Comment, supra note 31, at 2 (The Comment called for the funds transfer
proposal to address "know your customer" standards on the grounds that without knlowledge
of the customer, "there is nothing inherently suspicious about a check, a wire transfer, or an
[automated clearing house] transaction drawn on collected funds."); see also Money Launder-
ing, supra note 83, at 169 (statement of Cliff E. Cook, Vice President and Compliance Officer,
Puget Sound National Bank, speaking on behalf of the American Bankers Association) ("mhe
key reporting goal is the time-honored 'know your customer' standard.").
250. BAI Comment, supra note 31, at 2.
251. Of course, any reduction in the numbers of accounts or transfers subject to record-
keeping assists both the law enforcement agencies that must review records and the banks and
other financial institutions that otherwise have to capture, record, and maintain records and
respond to requests for information about those accounts. But see Money Laundering En-
forcement Amendments of 1991 (H.R. 26): Hearing on H.R. 26 Before the Subcomm. on
Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1991) [hereinafter Money Laundering
Enforcement Amendments of 1991] (statement of Peter K. Nunez, Assistant Secretary for
Enforcement, Department of Treasury, opposing issuance of guidelines as too useful to money
launderers).
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Among the most problematic aspects of the funds transfer proposal is its
failure to consider the technological state of the industry and the nature of
the majority of transfers conducted through the system. As a result, the
Treasury seeks to restructure the industry to obtain information that is
largely available in other forms and that will be of questionable utility
because of foreign bank secrecy laws. The Treasury shows no consideration
of the substantial (initial and ongoing) costs of creating more readily
retrievable data for the minimal percentage of transfers processed annually
through the United States system that actually involve money laundering.
As one commentator explained, it is not accurate to describe the proposal
as "enhanced recordkeeping" when it calls for the acquisition of completely
new information not currently in the bank's possession, a task entailing
significant additional cost. 2
Another flaw of the proposal is the manner of its preparation: the
Treasury did not conduct a Regulatory Impact Analysis2 3 as it formulated
the proposal.Y As a consequence, the Treasury did not address the basic
implementation costs or risks to domestic banks in terms of loss of income
from customers currently using funds transfers as a large-dollar payment
mechanism and other risks such as the attendant danger to the country's
currency position and of the likelihood of increasing offshore netting and
clearing arrangements. While the proposal, along with other recent regula-
tion under the Bank Secrecy Act, demonstrates the zeal with which the
United States government wishes to pursue those who traffic in drugs and
those who aid them in concealing their identities and profits, law enforce-
ment and regulatory agencies appear to have assumed that the benefits of
each regulation proffered as part of the overall antidrug strategy would
exceed the costs. The banking industry has seemed unwilling to challenge
252. Comment Letter from National Westminster Bank USA to the Department of the
Treasury 3 (Jan. 17, 1991).
253. A Regulatory Impact Analysis is required under Executive Order 12,291 for every
"major rule." Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601,
at 473 (1988).
254. In the 1990 Funds Transfer Proposal, the Treasury explained that because commentators
on the 1989 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking did not demonstrate that that proposal
would cost more than $100 million to implement the Treasury did not perform a Regulatory
Impact Analysis on the revised proposal. 1990 Funds Transfer Proposal, supra note 8, at
41,702. This approach ignores the vast differences between the 1989 Advance Notice and the
1990 Funds Transfer Proposal in terms of the scope and the amount of technological change
that industry members estimate would be necessary to implement the revised proposal.
The Bank Association for Foreign Trade (BAFT) conducted a cost analysis of the proposal,
which it submitted to the Treasury. BAI Comment, supra note 31, at 5 n.2. Banks and non-
bank financial institutions see the Treasury's failure to evaluate the costs and benefits of the
proposal as a major issue in the proceeding. See American Express Comment, supra note 14,
at 2-3; Citicorp Comment II, supra note 70, at 6.
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them on this issue. 2 5 Accordingly, the United States government has not
hesitated to impose additional burdens on the banking industry,256 an
industry that it perceived (perhaps appropriately) as making huge profits
from deposits held by money launderers .2 7 It was not until the spate of
proposals in 1989 and 1990VI that the banking industry began to voice
major objections to additional bank secrecy regulations.
If the burdens of the Treasury's funds transfer proposal exceed the
benefits that it would produce for law enforcement purposes, it is time to
consider what alternatives exist for policing money laundering through
financial institutions and, in particular, for investigating money laundering
through funds transfers. 2 9 This Article describes new incentives for the
creation of records and contracts and highlights the increase in data about
funds transfers that will be generated as Article 4A comes into effect. 260
These records and contracts would reach some of the more significant issues
identified in the funds transfer proposal, such as the identity of the beneficial
owners of the funds transferred. 261 In addition, to the extent that the Fedwire
regulations262 now follow Article 4A's definitions of key terms such as
255. Judging from the comments on the funds transfer proposal, banks have seen a great
risk in opposing the burdens of regulation under the Bank Secrecy Act. E.g., Republic Bank
Comment, supra note 46, at 1. Banks' overall reaction suggests their belief that challenging
any regulation under the Bank Secrecy Act is tantamount to opposing the proverbial "moth-
erhood and apple pie."
256. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
257. See generally I. WALTER, supra note 176, at 161, 167, 245 (1990) (describing, inter alia,
Eduardo Orozco Prada, who deposited more than $150 million in cash in approximately 18
banks and foreign currency firms primarily in New York, and transferred it to Panama, the
Cayman Islands, the Bahamas, and accounts throughout the U.S.; Latin couriers who deposited
bags of bills in small denominations in Florida banks, known as "Coin-O-Wasters;" and 1,163
currency transactions totalling $1.22 billion in which Bank of Boston had participated without
filing currency transaction reports); How Bankers Lent a Hand to Money Laundering Schemes,
Am. Banker, Feb. 15, 1985, at 4, col. 1.
258. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
259. Other commentators have called for re-evaluation of United States policy on money
laundering. See Rusch, Hue and Cry in the Counting-House: Some Observations of the Bank
Secrecy Act, 37 CATH. U. L. REv. 465 (1988); Villa, A Critical View of Bank Secrecy Act
Enforcement and the Money Laundering Statutes, 37 CAH. U.L. REv. 489 (1988). For a
recent discussion of funds transfer and Bank Secrecy Act requirements, see Maroldy, Note,
Recordkeeping and Reporting in an Attempt to Stop the Money Laundering Cycle: Why
Blanket Recording and Reporting of Wire and Electronic Funds Transfers Is Not the Answer,
66 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 863 (1991).
260. Because New York has adopted U.C.C. Article 4A and New York law applies to
CHIPS transfers and because the Federal Reserve Board adopted much of Article 4A for
Fedwire transfers, Article 4A became the instant standard for a very large percentage of the
world's funds transfers. See supra notes 193-94, 239-41 and accompanying text.
I hesitate to describe Article 4A's incentives as market-based. The incentives, however, exist
so that originators' banks and their customers can allocate the risks that each will bear if a
funds transfer is unauthorized or improperly executed.
261. See supra notes 76-77 & 206-22 and accompanying text.
262. The October 1990 amendments to Regulation J adopt most of the definitions of Article
4A. 55 Fed. Reg. 40,791 (1990) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 210).
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"sender,"' ' 3 "originator, ' '264 "receiving bank, ' 265 "originator's bank, ' 2"
and "beneficiary's bank," 267 the identity of the funds transfer participants
should become clearer and the trail of monies transferred between accounts
within the United States likewise should become easier to trace. As a
companion to these records, the funds transfer industry can enhance the
capacity of its communications systems to provide additional data, such as
the identity of the "originator" 268 and the purpose of the transfer. 269 The
amount of data available without the imposition of additional regulation
also will expand as the Federal Reserve Board obtains results from its
inititatives designed to provide data about the flow of cash and of funds
transfers within particular regions, around the United States, or to or from
specific foreign countries. 270
In addition to relying increasingly on existing or market-generated records
of funds transfers and funds transfer users, banking industry experts here
and abroad suggest that the federal government should focus on "primary
laundering," the process by which cash is moved around and out of the
United States. 27' They contend that it is easier to catch domestic mail parcels
and couriers with suitcases of cash272 as the cash moves to a depository bank
or laundering business front273 than it is to identify the money as laundered
when it is transferred back into the United States. 2 4 Investigation of primary
laundering relies on traditional law enforcement techniques such as leads and
informers, and on effective enforcement of existing (and anticipated) currency
transaction reporting requirements against banks, financial institutions, and
others subject to currency transaction requirements. 27 This approach requires
263. U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(5) (1991).
264. U.C.C. § 4A-104(c).
265. U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(4).
266. U.C.C. § 4A-104(d).
267. U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(3).
268. Article 4A defines "originator" as "the sender of the first payment order in a funds
transfer." U.C.C. § 4A-104(c).
269. See NYCH Comment, supra note 24, at 16.
270. See Money Laundering Legislation, supra note 10, at 72-73 (statement of Clyde H.
Farnsworth, Jr., Director, Division of Federal Reserve Bank Operations, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System). The Federal Reserve Board maintains it can provide data
about Fedwire transfers at practically "any level of detail." Id. at 73.
271. See Federal Reserve Board Comment, supra note 15, at 14; Lascelles, Money Laundering
Under Siege, Financial Times, Apr. 20, 1990, at 39, col.5.
272. The proceeds of drug trafficking, customarily caches of $20 bills, are extremely heavy.
For example, $1 million in $20's weighs 113 pounds (at 441 bills per pound). Money Laundering
in Florida, supra note 2, at 113 (statement of Charles Intriago, Esq., Publisher of Money
Laundering Alert).
273. Drug Money Laundering Control Efforts, supra note 31, at 43 (statement of Timothy
D. Mahoney, Director of Special Investigations Division, New York Banking Department);
Federal Reserve Comment, supra note 15, at 14.
274. E.g., Federal Reserve Comment, supra note 15, at 14.
275. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (1990). For a discussion of the history of Bank Secrecy Act
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aggressive use of all existing data-data on domestic and international
movements of United States currency and on funds transfers processed
through Fedwire. It also presupposes increased reliance on banks and others
to "know" their customers and to report suspect transactions in accordance
with procedures already employed by major banks276 and with the Basle
Committee's Principles.277
The Treasury furthermore should stop playing regulatory "leapfrog" with
money launderers and concentrate its efforts on designing a cohesive strategy
involving domestic enforcement efforts. Regulatory leapfrog imposes many
costs on the banking industry in addition to those associated with imple-
menting and maintaining compliance with new regulatory requirements.
These additional costs to the industry include the significant expense asso-
ciated with evaluating and commenting on each proposal,278 as well as the
intangible, unpredictable costs created by raised anxiety levels about future
regulations. 279
The current approach of imposing additional layers of regulations also
provides too much notice to money launderers of the coming changes in
investigative approach.280 Lengthy delays associated with rulemaking pro-
requirements, see DeFeo, Depriving International Narcotics Traffickers and Other Organized
Criminals of Illegal Proceeds and Combatting Money Laundering, 18 DEN. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 405 (1990).
276. See e.g., Money Laundering, supra note 83, at 160-65 (statement of Cliff E. Cook,
Vice President and Compliance Officer, Puget Sound National Bank, speaking on behalf of
the American Bankers Association) (describing activities of major banks concerning suspicious
transaction reports). The Department of Justice has advocated reliance on "know your
customer" standards in preference to prosecutorial guidelines such as those called for in H.R.
26, the "Money Laundering Enforcement Amendments of 1991," on the ground that "law
enforcement can only give general advice [regarding what constitutes suspicious transactions]
given the fluid, ever-changing nature of money laundering operations. Were black and white
rules developed, money launderers would switch methods of operations so as to the [sic] bypass
these profiles." Letter from W. Lee Rawls, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice
to Hon. Frank Annunzio, House of Representatives (Feb. 14, 1991), reprinted in Money
Laundering Enforcement Amendments of 1991, supra note 251, at 75.
277. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
278. The costs for the funds transfer proposal to date have included analysis of the 1989
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and of the 1990 Advanced Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, preparation of one or two rounds of formal comments, and delays in acquiring
computer hardware and software while the rulemaking is pending. If one assumed an average
cost of $2,000 to produce each of the approximately 500 comments on the two phases of the
funds transfer proposal-a ridiculously low figure given the length and thoughtfulness of many
of the comments reviewed by this author-the industry has already spent $1 million on the
funds transfer proposal.
279. A few of the comments on the funds transfer proposal, reflecting these anxieties, called
for a "safe harbor" provision for banks that make good faith efforts to comply. See supra
note 139 and accompanying text.
280. We must assume that money launderers have known of the funds transfer proposal
from the date of each publication in the Federal Register-in part because both the 1989
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and the 1990 Advance Notice of Proposed Rule-
making attracted considerable attention in the lay and trade presses. See Treasury Issues Wire
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ceedings in fact provide opportunities for money launderers to restructure
their activities to avoid detection. As part of a new comprehensive strategy,
the Treasury Department should rethink its current reliance on new spe-
cialized records, such as those called for in the funds transfer proposal,
and focus instead on training to use existing records of funds transfers and
cash or monetary instruments transactions. One of the advantages of training
is that it gives money launderers less notice of the shift of attention. In
addition, new initiatives in investigation of money laundering should focus
on "primary laundering," particularly on face-to-face cash and monetary
instruments transactions, which are more likely to involve money laundering
than most other transactions.
In addition to rethinking its policy of requiring specialized records and
reporting of transactions that may involve money laundering, the United
States should continue to work with its allies, such as the G-7 Financial
Action Task Force,281 and with international organizations, particularly the
United Nations, to increase international efforts to stem drug trafficking
and associated money laundering. 282 In particular, the United States needs
to work more closely with the G-7 group and its other trading partners to
achieve consistency in their approaches to money laundering so that it
becomes increasingly more difficult to hide drug proceeds in banks through-
out the world. 2 a The United States government must do this with full
recognition of the sensitivity of other nations to its previous extraterritorial
excursions, particularly the attempts by United States law enforcement
Transfer Proposal as Bankers Blast Latest Industry Burden, supra note 89, at 549; Treasury
Department Prepares to Issue Rule Governing National, Global Wire Transfers, 90-39 Savings
& Loan Rep. 5 (Oct. 19, 1990); B. Atkinson, Regulatory Agencies Poised for Big Changes,
Am. Banker, Dec. 26, 1990, at 1; N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1990, § 1, at 9, col. 1 (late ed.);
Garsson, Banks Fear Big Burden in New Rules on Wires, Am. Banker, Oct. 3, 1990, at 1.
As a result, it would have been easy for money launderers to learn of the proposals whether
or not they employed lawyers to follow such developments. In addition, it is likely that they
have known of the prospect of additional funds transfer regulations since the enactment of
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as amended
in scattered titles of U.S.C.). Indeed, since October 14, 1990, money laundering has been the
topic of 1720 articles accessible through the Lexis-Nexis legal research system and, no doubt,
of countless more in newspapers not accessible through Lexis-Nexis.
281. In one commentator's view, this group has emerged as the primary international
organization focusing on money laundering. Money Laundering Enforcement Amendments of
1991, supra note 251, at 11 (statement of Peter K. Nunez, Assistant Secretary for Enforcement,
Department of Treasury). Section 22 of H.R. 26 directs the Secretary of the Treasury to enter
discussions with countries whose institutions are engaging in activities involving the proceeds
of international drug trafficking to encourage the countries to adopt comprehensive antimoney
laundering laws and to obtain cooperation in prosecution of drug traffickers and money
launderers. Id.
282. One of he greatest successes in improving international cooperation is the U.N.
Convention Aganst Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20,
1988, U.N. Docz-E/CoNF. 82/15 (1988), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989). Of course,
international cooperation on money laundering also would aid international efforts to thwart
terrorism and others using money laundering to obscure illegal activities.
283. For example, the European Community has proposed a bank directive on money
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agencies to reach foreign bank records without following recognized inter-
national procedures.m
CONCLUSION
The funds transfer proposal reflects weaknesses in the Treasury's current
approach to regulations under the Bank Secrecy Act. It demonstrates a
willingness to impose substantial new obligations on the banking system
without careful evaluation of their potential efficacy, without measuring the
utility of prior regulations before adopting additional regulations, and
without regard to costs imposed on the banking community. It also suggests
a lack of coordination with other federal financial regulatory agencies,
particularly the Federal Reserve Board, and a lack of appreciation of
potential benefits in developments such as the adoption of U.C.C. Article
4A and the forthcoming revision of the CHIPS format. 28s Finally, the funds
transfer proposal, as well as the other new requirements proposed in 1989
and 1990, suggests that existing methods of detecting money laundering are
not working and argues for a comprehensive approach to detecting, pros-
ecuting, and deterring money laundering.
laundering that would become Community law. Bank Check on Drug Monies, [London] Daily
Telegraph, June 25, 1990, at 18.
284. See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text. These procedures include those set out
in the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties ratified in the last decade or letters rogatory. Letters
rogatory are the means by which one country, speaking through one of its courts, requests
another country, acting through its own courts and by methods of its court procedures and
entirely within the latter's control, to assist the administration of justice in the former country.
Governments and others use letters rogatory to secure the testimony of a witness resident in
the latter's jurisdiction and to obtain the testimony for use in the action pending in the former
jurisdiction. See The Signe, 37 F. Supp. 819, 820 (E.D. La. 1941); FED. R. Civ. P. 28;
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 815 (5th ed. 1979).
285. See supra notes 188-93 and accompanying text. For example, the Federal Reserve
Board's adoption of U.C.C. Article 4A for Fedwire preceded the Treasury's 1990 Funds
Transfer Proposal by only ten days, but the funds transfer proposal makes no mention or use
of the Board's action. See generally 1990 Funds Transfer Proposal, supra note 8.
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